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Abstract
We try to establish a unified information theoretic approach to learning and to ex-
plore some of its applications. First, we define predictive information as the mutual
information between the past and the future of a time series, discuss its behav-
ior as a function of the length of the series, and explain how other quantities of
interest studied previously in learning theory—as well as in dynamical systems
and statistical mechanics—emerge from this universally definable concept. We
then prove that predictive information provides the unique measure for the com-
plexity of dynamics underlying the time series and show that there are classes
of models characterized by power–law growth of the predictive information that are
qualitatively more complex than any of the systems that have been investigated
before. Further, we investigate numerically the learning of a nonparametric prob-
ability density, which is an example of a problem with power–law complexity,
and show that the proper Bayesian formulation of this problem provides for the
‘Occam’ factors that punish overly complex models and thus allow one to learn
not only a solution within a specific model class, but also the class itself using the data
only and with very few a priori assumptions. We study a possible information
theoretic method that regularizes the learning of an undersampled discrete vari-
able, and show that learning in such a setup goes through stages of very different
complexities. Finally, we discuss how all of these ideas may be useful in various
problems in physics, statistics, and, most importantly, biology.
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1“All of the books in the world contain no more information than is broadcast as
video in a single large American city in a single year. Not all bits have equal
value.”
Carl Sagan1
“My interest is in the future because I am going to spend the rest of my life
there.”
Charles F. Kettering
“That is what learning is. You suddenly understand something you’ve
understood all your life, but in a new way.”
Doris Lessing
“Learning is not compulsory. . . Neither is survival.”
W. Edwards Deming
“Where is the knowledge we’ve lost in information?”
T. S. Eliot
“What most experimenters take for granted before they begin their experiments
is infinitely more interesting than any results to which their experiments lead.”
Norbert Wiener
1All quotations shown on this page can be found at the electronic archive
http://www.starlingtech.com/quotes/
Chapter 1
Introduction: what do we know?
We hope that while reading this work our readers will unsurprisingly realize that
they actually are learning something. However, what may come as a surprise is
that they learn a lot more than they think: while reading this very sentence the
photoreceptors in the eyes estimate the mean intensity of the ambient light and
adapt to it; the auditory cortex monitors the surroundings and warns if a visi-
tor knocks on the door. The reader skips the endings of some long, complicated
words because he has already guessed what is coming; he then notices peculiar-
ities in the stylistics of the text and soon learns to distinguish sentences written
late at night. And then, finally, there is the “true” learning of the thoughts that
the authors try to convey in their writing.
Learning is everywhere around and inside us, and it is absolutely essential
for our second–to–second survival. In fact, because of its utmost importance and
omnipresence each one of us has a well developed personal, unique intuition
on what “learning” means, and how it works. One might think that such enor-
mous experience would come in handy when studying learning from a scientific
perspective, but the situation is quite the opposite: it is extremely difficult to
build a theory that unites the enormous spectrum of possible learning problems.
2
3Intuition built up for the case of learning to play a musical instrument may be
totally useless (and even destructive) for studying, for example, how we learn
our first language, or master mathematical concepts. A multitude of ideas and
approaches, each treating its specific problem and having only a slight relation to
another, is indeed what we see in learning science now.
In fact, there even is no such thing as the “learning theory.” There is statistical
learning theory, which builds probabilistic bounds on our ability to estimate the
parameters of models that describe some observations, and its formalism seems
completely disjoint from the designs of psychological and physiological exper-
iments that study learning in humans and animals. Then there is the Minimal
Description Length paradigm, which states that the shorter is the code for a set
of samples, the better is the knowledge of the structure inside the samples; it is
not clear how to connect these ideas to numerous learning curves defined in spe-
cific contexts of neural networks. Then there are ideas that since the speed or
(conversely) the difficulty of learning is related intuitively to the complexity of
the studied problem, learning and complexity should be studied together; this
opens the Pandora box of different approaches to complexity (later in this work
we list over a dozen of definitions of this quantity!) and does not even come close
to quantifying learning and complexity of, say, some simple geometric concept.
We can continue this list, but the point is clear. We believe that specific learning
scenarios, however interesting and practical they may be, are not going to bring
any more insight to our current understanding of learning (and, for that matter,
complexity). What we need at this stage is not another example—there are too
many of them to comprehend already—but a unifying, generalizing theory.
What do we expect from such a theory? We want it to be physical in its spirit.
4That is, it must explain and unify all accumulated knowledge of the subject (and
thus necessarily have an element of a review), but this explanation should bring
a new level of understanding to the old problems, a level from which all the
problems appear as different realizations of one general phenomenon. However,
explaining old data is just a half of a good theory. Using new tools we must also
be able to ask and answer meaningful new questions, thus the theory should be
constructive enough to serve as a kernel for development.
We build our presentation to address all of these questions. In Chapter 2 we
introduce a version of the theory of learning and complexity which is built on
information theory and the notion of predictability. After finishing the construc-
tion, we extensively analyze the literature to show that most of prior knowledge
of the subject is subsumed in our more general approach. Then we try to show
that the ideas do not only explain the old results but can be used to study new
problems as well. For this, we discuss a broad spectrum of possible applica-
tions to physics, to computer science, and to biology, and then single out two
examples for a detailed analysis. In Chapter 3 we study applications of our ideas
to the learning of nonparametric continuous probability densities, and we show
how complexity penalizing Occam factors work in this case. Then in Chapter 4
we turn to the seemingly easier problem of learning a probability distribution of
a discrete variable, and we study how regularization based only on information
theory makes learning possible in the undersampled regime.
One may argue that the examples we discuss are not enough to claim for cer-
tain that our theory indeed is constructive. We hope to resolve these fears in the
nearest future by studying other possible applications that we mention through-
out our work. However, we want to stress here explicitly that we believe that the
5theory itself is complete, the definitions that we make are sensible and unique,
and the conclusions are general and universal.
Chapter 2
Predictability, Complexity, and
Learning
2.1 Why study predictability?
There is an obvious interest in having practical algorithms for predicting the fu-
ture, and there is a correspondingly large literature on the problem of time series
extrapolation.1 But prediction is both more and less than extrapolation: wemight
be able to predict, for example, the chance of rain in the coming week even if
we cannot extrapolate the trajectory of temperature fluctuations. In the spirit of
its thermodynamic origins, information theory (Shannon 1948) characterizes the
potentialities and limitations of all possible prediction algorithms, as well as uni-
fying the analysis of extrapolation with the more general notion of predictability.
Specifically, we can define a quantity—the predictive information—that measures
1The classic papers are by Kolmogoroff (1939, 1941) andWiener (1949), who essentially solved
all the extrapolation problems that could be solved by linear methods. Our understanding of pre-
dictability was changed by developments in dynamical systems, which showed that apparently
random (chaotic) time series could arise from simple deterministic rules, and this led to vigorous
exploration of nonlinear extrapolation algorithms (Abarbanel et al. 1993). For a review com-
paring different approaches, see the conference proceedings edited by Weigend and Gershenfeld
(1994).
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howmuch our observations of the past can tell us about the future. The predictive
information characterizes the world we are observing, and we shall see that this
characterization is close to our intuition about the complexity of the underlying
dynamics.
Prediction is one of the fundamental problems in neural computation. Much
of what we admire in expert human performance is predictive in character—the
point guard who passes the basketball to a place where his teammate will arrive
in a split second, the chess master who knows how moves made now will influ-
ence the end game two hours hence, the investor who buys a stock in anticipation
that it will grow in the year to come. More generally, we gather sensory informa-
tion not for its own sake but in the hope that this information will guide our
actions (including our verbal actions). But acting takes time, and sense data can
guide us only to the extent that those data inform us about the state of the world
at the time of our actions, so the only components of the incoming data that have
a chance of being useful are those that are predictive. Put bluntly, nonpredictive
information is useless to the organism, and it therefore makes sense to isolate the
predictive information. It will turn out that most of the information we collect
over a long period of time is nonpredictive, so that isolating the predictive infor-
mation must go a long way toward separating out those features of the sensory
world that are relevant for behavior.
One of the most important examples of prediction is the phenomenon of gen-
eralization in learning. Learning is formalized as finding a model that explains
or describes a set of observations, but again this is useful precisely (and only) be-
cause we expect this model will continue to be valid: in the language of learning
theory [see, for example, Vapnik (1998)] an animal can gain selective advantage
2.1. Why study predictability? 8
not from its performance on the training data but only from its performance at
generalization. Generalizing—and not “overfitting” the training data—is pre-
cisely the problem of isolating those features of the data that have predictive
value (see also Bialek and Tishby, in preparation). Further, we know that the
success of generalization hinges on controlling the complexity of the models that
we are willing to consider as possibilities. Finally, learning a model to describe
a data set can be seen as an encoding of those data, as emphasized by Rissanen
(1989), and the quality of this encoding can be measured using the ideas of in-
formation theory. Thus the exploration of learning problems should provide us with
explicit links among the concepts of entropy, predictability, and complexity.
The notion of complexity arises not only in learning theory, but also in several
other contexts. Some physical systems exhibit more complex dynamics than oth-
ers (turbulent vs. laminar flows in fluids), and some systems evolve toward more
complex states than others (spin glasses vs. ferromagnets). The problem of char-
acterizing complexity in physical systems has a substantial literature of its own
[for an overview see Bennett (1990)]. In this context several authors have con-
sidered complexity measures based on entropy or mutual information, although
as far as we know no clear connections have been drawn among the measures of
complexity that arise in learning theory and those that arise in dynamical systems
and statistical mechanics.
An essential difficulty in quantifying complexity is to distinguish complexity
from randomness. A true random string cannot be compressed and hence re-
quires a long description; it thus is complex in the sense defined by Kolmogorov
(1965, Li and Vita´nyi 1993, Vita´nyi and Li 2000), yet the physical process that
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generates this string may have a very simple description. Both in statistical me-
chanics and in learning theory our intuitive notions of complexity correspond to
the statements about complexity of the underlying process, and not directly to
the description length or Kolmogorov complexity.
Our central result is that the predictive information provides a general measure of
complexity which includes as special cases some relevant concepts from learning
theory and from dynamical systems. While the work on the complexity of mod-
els in learning theory rests specifically on the idea that one is trying to infer a
model from data, the predictive information is a property of the data (or, more
precisely, of an ensemble of data) itself without reference to a specific class of
underlying models. If the data are generated by a process in a known class but
with unknown parameters, then we can calculate the predictive information ex-
plicitly and show that this information diverges logarithmically with the size of the
data set we have observed; the coefficient of this divergence counts the number of
parameters in the model, or more precisely the effective dimension of the model
class, and this provides a link to known results of Rissanen and others. But our
approach also allows us to quantify the complexity of processes that fall outside
the finite dimensional models of conventional learning theory, and we show that
thesemore complex processes are characterized by a power–law rather than a logarithmic
divergence of the predictive information.
By analogy with the analysis of critical phenomena in statistical physics, the
separation of logarithmic from power–law divergences, together with the mea-
surement of coefficients and exponents for these divergences, allows us to define
“universality classes” for the complexity of data streams. The power–law or non-
parametric class of processes may be crucial in real world learning tasks, where
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the effective number of parameters becomes so large that asymptotic results for
finitely parameterizable models are inaccessible in practice. There is empirical
evidence that simple physical systems can generate dynamics in this complexity
class, and there are hints that language also may fall in this class.
Finally, we argue that the divergent components of the predictive information pro-
vide a unique measure of complexity that is consistent with certain simple require-
ments. This argument is in the spirit of Shannon’s original derivation of entropy
as the unique measure of available information. We believe that this uniqueness
argument provides a conclusive answer to the question of how one should quan-
tify the complexity of a process generating a time series.
With the evident cost of lengthening our discussion, we have tried to give a
self–contained presentation that develops our point of view, uses simple exam-
ples to connect with known results, and then generalizes and goes beyond these
results.2 Even in cases where at least the qualitative form of our results is known
from previous work, we believe that our point of view elucidates some issues
that may have been less the focus of earlier studies. Last but not least, we explore
the possibilities for connecting our theoretical discussion with the experimental
characterization of learning and complexity in neural systems.
2.2 A curious observation
Before starting the systematic analysis of the problem, we want to motivate our
discussion further by presenting results of some simple numerical experiments.
2Some of the basic ideas presented here, together with some connections to earlier work, can
be found in brief preliminary reports (Bialek 1995; Bialek and Tishby 1999). The central results of
the present work, however, were at best conjectures in these preliminary accounts.
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Figure 2.1: Calculating entropy of words of length 4 in a chain of 17 spins. For
this chain, n(W0) = n(W1) = n(W3) = n(W7) = n(W12) = n(W14) = 2, n(W8) =
n(W9) = 1, and all other frequencies are zero. Thus, S(4) ≈ 2.95 bits.
Suppose we have a 1-dimensional chain of Ising spins with the Hamiltonian
given by
H = −∑
i,j
Jijσiσj, (2.1)
where the matrix Jij is not necessarily tridiagonal (that is, long range interac-
tions are also allowed). One may identify spins pointing upwards with 1 and
downwards with 0, and then a spin chain is equivalent to some sequence of bi-
nary digits. This sequence consists of (overlapping) words of N digits each, Wk,
k = 0, 1 · · ·2N − 1. Even though there are 2N such words total, they appear with
very different frequencies n(Wk) in the spin chain [see Fig. (2.1) for details]. If the
number of spins is large, then counting these frequencies provides a good empir-
ical estimate to PN(Wk), the probability distribution of different words of length
N . Then one can calculate the entropy S(N) of this probability distribution by
the usual formula
S(N) = −
2N−1∑
k=0
PN(Wk) log2 PN(Wk) (bits). (2.2)
Since entropy is an extensive property, S(N) is asymptotically proportional to
N for any spin chain. Choosing a different set of couplings Jij may change the
coefficient of proportionality (and finding this coefficient is usually the goal of
2.2. A curious observation 12
5 10 15 20 25
0
5
10
15
20
25
 N
 
S
fixed  J                                       
variable  J, short range interactions          
variable  J’s, long range decaying interactions
Figure 2.2: Entropy as a function of the word length for spin chains with different
interactions. Notice that all lines start from S(N) = log2 2 = 1 since at the values
of the coupling we investigated the correlation length is much smaller than the
chain length (1 · 109 spins).
statistical mechanics) but the linearity is never challenged.
We investigated this in three different spin chains of one billion spins each (the
temperature is always kBT = 1). For the first chain, only Ji,i+1 = 1 was nonzero,
and its value was the same for all i’s. The second chain was also generated using
the nearest neighbor interactions, but the value of the coupling was reinitialized
every 400,000 spins by taking a random number from a Gaussian distribution
with a zero mean and a unit variance. In the third case, we again reinitialized
at the same frequency, but now interactions were long–ranged, and the variance
of coupling constants decreased with the distance between the spins as 〈J2ij〉 =
1/(i − j)2. We plotted S(N) for all these cases in Fig. (2.2), and, of course, the
asymptotically linear behavior seems to be evident—the extensive entropy shows
2.2. A curious observation 13
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Figure 2.3: Subextensive part of the entropy as a function of the word length.
no qualitative distinction between the three cases we consider.
However, the situation changes drastically if we remove the asymptotic linear
contribution and plot only the sublinear component S1(N) of the entropy. As we
see in Fig. (2.3), the three investigated chains then exhibit qualitatively different
features: for the first one, S1 is constant; for the second one, it is logarithmic; and,
for the third one, it clearly shows a power–law behavior.
What is the significance of this observation? Of course, the differences must
be related to the ways we chose J ’s for the simulations. In the first case, J is
fixed, and there is not much one can learn from observing the spin chain. For
the second chain, J changes, and the statistics of the spin–words is different in
different parts of the sequence. By looking at this statistics, one can thus esti-
mate coupling at the current position. Finally, in the third case there are many
coupling constants that can be learned. In principle, as N increases one becomes
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sensitive to correlations caused by interactions over larger and larger distances,
and, since the variance of the couplings decays with the distance, interactions of
longer range do not interfere with learning short–scale properties. So, intuitively,
the qualitatively different behavior of S1(N) for the three plotted cases is due to
a different character of learning tasks involved in understanding the spin chains.
Much of this Chapter can be seen as expanding on and quantifying this intuitive
observation. 3
2.3 Fundamentals
The problem of prediction comes in various forms, as noted above. Information
theory allows us to treat the different notions of prediction on the same footing.
The first step is to recognize that all predictions are probabilistic—even if we can
predict the temperature at noon tomorrow, we should provide error bars or confi-
dence limits on our prediction. The next step is to remember that, even before we
look at the data, we know that certain futures are more likely than others, and we
can summarize this knowledge by a prior probability distribution for the future.
Our observations on the past lead us to a new, more tightly concentrated distri-
bution, the distribution of futures conditional on the past data. Different kinds
of predictions are different slices through or averages over this conditional distri-
bution, but information theory quantifies the “concentration” of the distribution
without making any commitment as to which averages will be most interesting.
Imagine that we observe a stream of data x(t) over a time interval−T < t < 0;
let all of these past data be denoted by the shorthand xpast. We are interested
3Note again that we are dealing here with subextensive properties of systems. These are the
properties that are ignored in most problems in statistical mechanics.
2.3. Fundamentals 15
in saying something about the future, so we want to know about the data x(t)
that will be observed in the time interval 0 < t < T ′; let these future data be
called xfuture. In the absence of any other knowledge, futures are drawn from the
probability distribution P (xfuture), while observations of particular past data xpast
tell us that futures will be drawn from the conditional distribution P (xfuture|xpast).
The greater concentration of the conditional distribution can be quantified by the
fact that it has smaller entropy than the prior distribution, and this reduction in
entropy is Shannon’s definition of the information that the past provides about
the future. We can write the average of this predictive information as
Ipred(T, T ′) =
〈
log2
[
P (xfuture|xpast)
P (xfuture)
]〉
(2.3)
= −〈log2 P (xfuture)〉 − 〈log2 P (xpast)〉
− [−〈log2 P (xfuture, xpast)〉] , (2.4)
where 〈· · ·〉 denotes an average over the joint distribution of the past and the
future, P (xfuture, xpast).
Each of the terms in Eq. (2.4) is an entropy. Since we are interested in pre-
dictability or generalization, which are associatedwith some features of the signal
persisting forever, we may assume stationarity or invariance under time transla-
tions. Then the entropy of the past data depends only on the duration of our
observations, so we can write −〈log2 P (xpast)〉 = S(T ), and by the same argument
−〈log2 P (xfuture)〉 = S(T ′). Finally, the entropy of the past and the future taken
together is the entropy of observations on a window of duration T + T ′, so that
−〈log2 P (xfuture, xpast)〉 = S(T + T ′). Putting these equations together, we obtain
Ipred(T, T ′) = S(T ) + S(T ′)− S(T + T ′). (2.5)
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In the same way that the entropy of a gas at fixed density is proportional to
the volume, the entropy of a time series (asymptotically) is proportional to its
duration, so that limT→∞ S(T )/T = S0; entropy is an extensive quantity. But from
Eq. (2.5) any extensive component of the entropy cancels in the computation of
the predictive information: predictability is a deviation from extensivity. If we write
S(T ) = S0T + S1(T ), then Eq. (2.5) tells us that the predictive information is
related only to the nonextensive term S1(T ).
We know two general facts about the behavior of S1(T ). First, the corrections
to extensive behavior are positive, S1(T ) ≥ 0. Second, the statement that entropy
is extensive is the statement that the limit
lim
T→∞
S(T )
T
= S0 (2.6)
exists, and for this to be true we must also have
lim
T→∞
S1(T )
T
= 0. (2.7)
Thus the nonextensive terms in the entropy must be subextensive, that is they
must grow with T less rapidly than a linear function. Taken together, these facts
guarantee that the predictive information is positive and subextensive. Further,
if we let the future extend forward for a very long time, T ′ → ∞, then we can
measure the information that our sample provides about the entire future,
Ipred(T ) = lim
T ′→∞
Ipred(T, T ′) = S1(T ). (2.8)
If we have been observing a time series for a (long) time T , then the total
amount of data we have taken in is measured by the entropy S(T ), and at large
T this is given approximately by S0T . But the predictive information that we
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have gathered cannot grow linearly with time, even if we are making predictions
about a future which stretches out to infinity. As a result, of the total information
we have taken in by observing xpast, only a vanishing fraction is of relevance to
the prediction:
lim
T→∞
Predictive Information
Total Information
=
Ipred(T )
S(T )
→ 0. (2.9)
In this precise sense, most of what we observe is irrelevant to the problem of
predicting the future. We can think of Eq. (2.9) as a law of diminishing returns:
although we collect data in proportion to our observation time T , a smaller and
smaller fraction of this information is useful in the problem of prediction. Note
that these diminishing returns are not due to a limited lifetime, since we calculate
the predictive information assuming that we have a future extending forward to
infinity.
Now consider the case where time is measured in discrete steps, so that we
have seenN time points x1, x2, · · · , xN . Howmuch have we learned about the un-
derlying pattern in these data? The more we know, the more effectively we can
predict the next data point xN+1 and hence the fewer bits we will need to describe
the deviation of this data point from our prediction: our accumulated knowledge
about the time series is measured by the degree to which we can compress the
description of new observations. On average, the length of the code word re-
quired to describe the point xN+1, given that we have seen the previousN points,
is given by
ℓ(N) = −〈log2 P (xN+1|x1, x2, · · · , xN)〉 bits, (2.10)
where the expectation value is taken over the joint distribution of all the N + 1
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points, P (x1, x2, · · · , xN , xN+1). It is easy to see that
ℓ(N) = S(N + 1)− S(N) ≈ ∂S(N)
∂N
. (2.11)
As we observe for longer times, we learn more and this word length decreases. It
is natural to define a learning curve that measures this improvement. Usually we
define learning curves bymeasuring the frequency or costs of errors; here the cost
is that our encoding of the point xN+1 is longer than it could be if we had perfect
knowledge. This ideal encoding has a length which we can find by imagining
that we observe the time series for an infinitely long time, ℓideal = limN→∞ ℓ(N),
but this is just another way of defining the extensive component of the entropy
S0. Thus we can define a learning curve
Λ(N) ≡ ℓ(N)− ℓideal (2.12)
= S(N + 1)− S(N)− S0
= S1(N + 1)− S1(N)
≈ ∂S1(N)
∂N
=
∂Ipred(N)
∂N
, (2.13)
and we see once again that the extensive component of the entropy cancels.
It is well known that the problems of prediction and compression are related,
and what we have done here is to illustrate one aspect of this connection. Specif-
ically, if we ask how much one segment of a time series can tell us about the
future, the answer is contained in the subextensive behavior of the entropy. If we
ask howmuch we are learning about the structure of the time series, then the nat-
ural and universally defined learning curve is related again to the subextensive
entropy: the learning curve is the derivative of the predictive information.
This universal learning curve is connected to the more conventional learning
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curves in specific contexts. As an example (cf. Section 2.4.1), consider fitting a set
of data points {xn, yn} with some class of functions y = f(x;α), where the α are
unknown parameters that need to be learned; we also allow for some Gaussian
noise in our observation of the yn. Here the natural learning curve is the evolution
of χ2 for generalization as a function of the number of examples. Within the
approximations discussed below, it is straightforward to show that asN becomes
large,
〈χ2(N)〉 = 1
σ2
〈[y − f(x;α)]2〉 → 2 ln 2 Λ(N) + 1, (2.14)
where σ2 is the variance of the noise. Thus a more conventional measure of per-
formance at learning a function is equal to the universal learning curve defined
purely by information theoretic criteria. In other words, if a learning curve is
measured in the right units, then its integral represents the amount of the useful
information accumulated. Since one would expect any learning curve to decrease
to zero eventually, we again obtain the ‘law of diminishing returns’.
Different quantities related to the subextensive entropy have been discussed
in several contexts. For example, the code length ℓ(N) has been defined as a
learning curve in the specific case of neural networks (Opper and Haussler 1995)
and has been termed the “thermodynamic dive” (Crutchfield and Shalizi 1998)
and “N th order block entropy” (Grassberger 1986). Mutual information between
all of the past and all of the future (both semi–infinite) is known also as the “ex-
cess entropy,” “effective measure complexity,” “stored information,” and so on
[see Shalizi and Crutchfield (1999) and references therein, as well as the discus-
sion below]. If the data allow a description by a model with a finite number of
parameters, then mutual information between the data and the parameters is of
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interest, and this is also the predictive information about all of the future; some
special cases of this problem have been discussed by Opper and Haussler (1995)
and by Herschkowitz and Nadal (1999). What is important is that the predictive
information or subextensive entropy is related to all these quantities, and that it can be
defined for any process without a reference to a class of models. It is this universality
that we find appealing, and this universality is strongest if we focus on the limit
of long observation times. Qualitatively, in this regime (T → ∞) we expect the
predictive information to behave in one of three different ways: it may either stay
finite, or grow to infinity together with T ; in the latter case the rate of growth may
be slow (logarithmic) or fast (sublinear power).
The first possibility, limT→∞ Ipred(T ) = constant, means that no matter how
long we observe we gain only a finite amount of information about the future.
This situation prevails, for example, when the dynamics are too regular: for a
purely periodic system, complete prediction is possible once we know the phase,
and if we sample the data at discrete times this is a finite amount of information;
longer period orbits intuitively are more complex and also have larger Ipred, but
this doesn’t change the limiting behavior limT→∞ Ipred(T ) = constant.
Alternatively, the predictive information can be small when the dynamics
are irregular but the best predictions are controlled only by the immediate past,
so that the correlation times of the observable data are finite [see, for example,
Crutchfield and Feldman (1997) and the fixed short–range interactions plot on
Fig. (2.3)]. Imagine, for example, that we observe x(t) at a series of discrete times
{tn}, and that at each time point we find the value xn. Then we can always write
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the joint distribution of the N data points as a product,
P (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) = P (x1)P (x2|x1)P (x3|x2, x1) · · · . (2.15)
For Markov processes, what we observe at tn depends only on events at the pre-
vious time step tn−1, so that
P (xn|{x1≤i≤n−1}) = P (xn|xn−1), (2.16)
and hence the predictive information reduces to
Ipred =
〈
log2
[
P (xn|xn−1)
P (xn)
]〉
. (2.17)
The maximum possible predictive information in this case is the entropy of the
distribution of states at one time step, which in turn is bounded by the logarithm
of the number of accessible states. To approach this bound the systemmust main-
tain memory for a long time, since the predictive information is reduced by the
entropy of the transition probabilities. Thus systems with more states and longer
memories have larger values of Ipred.
More interesting are those cases in which Ipred(T )diverges at large T . In physi-
cal systems we know that there are critical points where correlation times become
infinite, so that optimal predictions will be influenced by events in the arbitrarily
distant past. Under these conditions the predictive information can grow with-
out bound as T becomes large; for many systems the divergence is logarithmic,
Ipred(T → ∞) ∝ lnT , as for the variable Jij, short range Ising model of Figs. (2.2,
2.3). Long range correlation also are important in a time series where we can learn
some underlying rules. It will turn out that when the set of possible rules can be
described by a finite number of parameters, the predictive information again di-
verges logarithmically, and the coefficient of this divergence counts the number
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of parameters. Finally, a faster growth is also possible, so that Ipred(T →∞) ∝ T α,
as for the variable Jij long range Ising model, and we shall see that this behavior
emerges from, for example, nonparametric learning problems.
2.4 Learning and predictability
Learning is of interest precisely in those situations where correlations or associ-
ations persist over long periods of time. In the usual theoretical models, there
is some rule underlying the observable data, and this rule is valid forever; ex-
amples seen at one time inform us about the rule, and this information can be
used to make predictions or generalizations. The predictive information quanti-
fies the average generalization power of examples, and we shall see that there is
a direct connection between the predictive information and the complexity of the
possible underlying rules.
2.4.1 A test case
Let us begin with a simple example already mentioned above. We observe two
streams of data x and y, or equivalently a stream of pairs (x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · ,
(xN, yN). Assume that we know in advance that the x’s are drawn independently
and at random from some distribution P (x), while the y’s are noisy versions of
some function acting on x,
yn = f(xn;α) + ηn, (2.18)
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where f(x;α) is a class of functions parameterized by α, and ηn is some noise
which for simplicity we will assume is Gaussian with some known standard de-
viation σ. We can even start with a very simple case, where the function class is
just a linear combination of some basis functions, so that
f(x;α) =
K∑
µ=1
αµφµ(x). (2.19)
The usual problem is to estimate, from N pairs {xi, yi}, the values of the param-
eters α; in favorable cases such as this we might even be able to find an effective
regression formula. We are interested in evaluating the predictive information,
which means that we need to know the entropy S(N). We go through the calcu-
lation in some detail because it provides a model for the more general case.
To evaluate the entropy S(N) we first construct the probability distribution
P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN). The same set of rules apply to the whole data stream,
which here means that the same parameters α apply for all pairs {xi, yi}, but
these parameters are chosen at random from a distribution P(α) at the start of
the stream. Thus we write
P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN)
=
∫
dKαP (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN|α)P(α) , (2.20)
and now we need to construct the conditional distributions for fixed α. By hy-
pothesis each x is chosen independently, and once we fix α each yi is correlated
only with the corresponding xi, so that we have
P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN|α) =
N∏
i=1
[P (xi)P (yi|xi;α)] . (2.21)
Further, with the simple assumptions above about the class of functions and
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Gaussian noise, the conditional distribution of yi has the form
P (yi|xi;α) = 1√
2πσ2
exp
− 1
2σ2
yi − K∑
µ=1
αµφµ(xi)
2
 . (2.22)
Putting all these factors together,
P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN)
=
[
N∏
i=1
P (xi)
](
1√
2πσ2
)N ∫
dKαP(α) exp
[
− 1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
y2i
]
× exp
−N
2
K∑
µ,ν=1
Aµν({xi})αµαν +N
K∑
µ=1
Bµ({xi, yi})αµ
 , (2.23)
where
Aµν({xi}) = 1
σ2N
N∑
i=1
φµ(xi)φν(xi), and (2.24)
Bµ({xi, yi}) = 1
σ2N
N∑
i=1
yiφµ(xi). (2.25)
Our placement of the factors of N means that both Aµν and Bµ are of order unity
as N → ∞. These quantities are empirical averages over the samples {xi, yi},
and if the φµ are well behaved we expect that these empirical means converge to
expectation values for most realizations of the series {xi}:
lim
N→∞
Aµν({xi}) = A∞µν =
1
σ2
∫
dxP (x)φµ(x)φν(x) , (2.26)
lim
N→∞
Bµ({xi, yi}) = B∞µ =
K∑
ν=1
A∞µν α¯ν , (2.27)
where α¯ are the parameters that actually gave rise to the data stream {xi, yi}. In
fact we can make the same argument about the terms in
∑
y2i ,
lim
N→∞
N∑
i=1
y2i = Nσ
2
 K∑
µ,ν=1
α¯µA
∞
µνα¯ν + 1
 . (2.28)
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Conditions for this convergence of empirical means to expectation values are at
the heart of learning theory. Our approach here is first to assume that this conver-
gence works, then to examine the consequences for the predictive information,
and finally to address the conditions for and implications of this convergence
breaking down.
Putting the different factors together, we obtain
P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN)
→˜
[
N∏
i=1
P (xi)
](
1√
2πσ2
)N ∫
dKαP(α) exp [−NEN (α; {xi, yi})] ,
(2.29)
where the effective “energy” per sample is given by
EN(α; {xi, yi}) = 1
2
+
1
2
K∑
µ,ν=1
(αµ − α¯µ)A∞µν(αν − α¯ν). (2.30)
Here we use the symbol →˜ to indicate that we not only take the limit of large N ,
but also neglect the fluctuations. Note that in this approximation the dependence
on the sample points themselves is hidden in the definition of α¯ as being the
parameters that generated the samples.
The integral that we need to do in Eq. (2.29) involves an exponential with a
large factor N in the exponent; the free energy FN is of order unity as N → ∞.
This suggests that we evaluate the integral by a saddle point or steepest descent
approximation [similar analyses were performed by Clarke and Barron (1990), by
MacKay (1992), and by Balasubramanian (1997)]:
∫
dKαP(α) exp [−NEN (α; {xi, yi})] ≈ P(αcl)
× exp
[
−NEN (αcl; {xi, yi})− K
2
ln
N
2π
− 1
2
ln detFN + · · ·
]
, (2.31)
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where αcl is the “classical” value of α determined by the extremal conditions
∂EN (α; {xi, yi})
∂αµ
∣∣∣∣∣
α=αcl
= 0, (2.32)
the matrix FN consists of the second derivatives of EN ,
FN = ∂
2EN(α; {xi, yi})
∂αµ∂αν
∣∣∣∣∣
α=αcl
, (2.33)
and · · · denotes terms that vanish as N → ∞. If we formulate the problem of
estimating the parameters α from the samples {xi, yi}, then as N →∞ the matrix
NFN is the Fisher information matrix (Cover and Thomas 1991); the eigenvectors
of this matrix give the principal axes for the error ellipsoid in parameter space,
and the (inverse) eigenvalues give the variances of parameter estimates along
each of these directions. The classical αcl differs from α¯ only in terms of order
1/N ; we neglect this difference and further simplify the calculation of leading
terms as N becomes large. After a little more algebra, then, we find the probabil-
ity distribution we have been looking for:
P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN)
→˜
[
N∏
i=1
P (xi)
]
1
ZA
P(α¯) exp
[
−N
2
ln(2πeσ2)− K
2
lnN + · · ·
]
, (2.34)
where the normalization constant
ZA =
√
(2π)K detA∞. (2.35)
Again we note that the sample points {xi, yi} are hidden in the value of α¯ that
gave rise to these points.4
4We emphasize again that there are two approximations leading to Eq. (2.34). First, we have
replaced empirical means by expectation values, neglecting fluctuations associated with the par-
ticular set of sample points {xi, yi}. Second, we have evaluated the average over parameters in a
2.4. Learning and predictability 27
To evaluate the entropy S(N)we need to compute the expectation value of the
(negative) logarithm of the probability distribution in Eq. (2.34); there are three
terms. One is constant, so averaging is trivial. The second term depends only
on the xi, and because these are chosen independently from the distribution P (x)
the average again is easy to evaluate. The third term involves α¯, and we need to
average this over the joint distribution P (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xN, yN). As above, we
can evaluate this average in steps: first we choose a value of the parameters α¯,
then we average over the samples given these parameters, and finally we average
over parameters. But because α¯ is defined as the parameters that generate the
samples, this stepwise procedure simplifies enormously. The end result is that
S(N) = N
[
Sx +
1
2
log2(2πeσ
2)
]
+
K
2
log2N + Sα + 〈log2 ZA〉α + · · · , (2.36)
where 〈· · ·〉α means averaging over parameters, Sx is the entropy of the distribu-
tion of x,
Sx = −
∫
dxP (x) log2 P (x), (2.37)
and similarly for the entropy of the distribution of parameters,
Sα = −
∫
dKαP(α) log2P(α). (2.38)
saddle point approximation. At least under some condition, both of these approximations would
become increasingly accurate as N → ∞, so that this approach should yield the asymptotic be-
havior of the distribution and hence the subextensive entropy at large N . Although we give a
more detailed analysis below, it is worth noting here how things can go wrong. The two ap-
proximations are independent, and we could imagine that fluctuations are important but saddle
point integration still works, for example. Controlling the fluctuations turns out to be exactly the
question of whether our finite parameterization captures the true dimensionality of the class of
models, as discussed in the classic work of Vapnik, Chervonenkis, and others [see Vapnik (1998)
for a review]. The saddle point approximation can break down because the saddle point becomes
unstable or because multiple saddle points become important. It will turn out that instability is
exponentially improbable as N → ∞, while multiple saddle points are a real problem in certain
classes of models, again when counting parameters doesn’t really measure the complexity of the
model class.
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The different terms in the entropy Eq. (2.36) have a straightforward interpre-
tation. First we see that the extensive term in the entropy,
S0 = Sx + 1
2
log2(2πeσ
2), (2.39)
reflects contributions from the random choice of x and from the Gaussian noise
in y; these extensive terms are independent of the variations in parameters α,
and these would be the only terms if the parameters were not varying (that is,
if there were nothing to learn). There also is a term which reflects the entropy
of variations in the parameters themselves, Sα. This entropy is not invariant
with respect to coordinate transformations in the parameter space, but the term
〈log2 ZA〉α compensates for this noninvariance. Finally, andmost interestingly for
our purposes, the subextensive piece of the entropy is dominated by a logarith-
mic divergence,
S1(N)→ K
2
log2N (bits). (2.40)
The coefficient of this divergence counts the number of parameters independent
of the coordinate system that we choose in the parameter space. Furthermore,
this result does not depend on the set of basis functions {φµ(x)}. This is a hint
that the result in Eq. (2.40) is more universal than our simple example.
2.4.2 Learning a parameterized distribution
The problem discussed above is an example of supervised learning: we are given
examples of how the points xn map into yn, and from these examples we are to in-
duce the association or functional relation between x and y. An alternative view is
that pair of points (x, y) should be viewed as a vector ~x, and what we are learning
is the distribution of this vector. The problem of learning a distribution usually
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is called unsupervised learning, but in this case supervised learning formally is a
special case of unsupervised learning; if we admit that all the functional relations
or associations that we are trying to learn have an element of noise or stochastic-
ity, then this connection between supervised and unsupervised problems is quite
general.
Suppose a series of random vector variables {~xi} are drawn independently
from the same probability distribution Q(~x|α), and this distribution depends on
a (potentially infinite dimensional) vector of parameters α. As above, the param-
eters are unknown, and before the series starts they are chosen randomly from
a distribution P(α). With no constraints on the densities P(α) or Q(~x|α) it is
impossible to derive any regression formulas for parameter estimation, but one
can still calculate the leading terms in the entropy of the data series and thus the
predictive information.
We begin with the definition of entropy
S(N) ≡ S[{~xi}] = −
∫
d~x1 · · · d~xN P (~x1, ~x2, · · · , ~xN) log2 P (~x1, ~x2, · · · , ~xN). (2.41)
By analogy with Eq. (2.20) we then write
P (~x1, ~x2, · · · , ~xN) =
∫
dKαP(α)
N∏
i=1
Q(~xi|α). (2.42)
Next, combining the last two equations and rearranging the order of integration,
we can rewrite S(N) as
S(N) = −
∫
dKα¯P(α¯)

∫
d~x1 · · · d~xN
N∏
j=1
Q(~xj|α¯) log2 P ({~xi})
 . (2.43)
Eq. (2.43) allows an easy interpretation. There is the ‘true’ set of parameters
α¯ that gave rise to the data sequence ~x1 · · ·~xN with the probability ∏Nj=1Q(~xj|α¯).
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We need to average log2 P (~x1 · · ·~xN) first over all possible realizations of the data
keeping the true parameters fixed, and then over the parameters α¯ themselves.
With this interpretation in mind, the joint probability density, the logarithm of
which is being averaged, can be rewritten in the following useful way:
P (~x1, · · · , ~xN) =
N∏
j=1
Q(~xj|α¯)
∫
dKαP(α)
N∏
i=1
[
Q(~xi|α)
Q(~xi|α¯)
]
=
N∏
j=1
Q(~xj|α¯)
∫
dKαP(α) exp [−NEN (α; {~xi})] , (2.44)
EN(α; {~xi}) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
[
Q(~xi|α)
Q(~xi|α¯)
]
. (2.45)
Since, by our interpretation, α¯ are the true parameters that gave rise to the partic-
ular data {~xi}, we may expect empirical means to converge to expectation values,
so that
EN(α; {~xi}) = −
∫
dDxQ(x|α¯) ln
[
Q(~x|α)
Q(~x|α¯)
]
− ψ(α, α¯; {xi}), (2.46)
where ψ → 0 as N →∞; here we neglect ψ, and return to this term below.
The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (2.46) is the Kullback–Leibler di-
vergence, DKL(α¯||α), between the true distribution characterized by parameters
α¯ and the possible distribution characterized by α. Thus at large N we have
P (~x1, ~x2, · · · , ~xN)→˜
N∏
j=1
Q(~xj|α¯)
∫
dKαP(α) exp [−NDKL(α¯||α)] , (2.47)
where again the notation →˜ reminds us that we are not only taking the limit of
large N but also making another approximation in neglecting fluctuations. By
the same arguments as above we can proceed (formally) to compute the entropy
of this distribution, and we find
S(N) ≈ S0 ·N + S(a)1 (N), (2.48)
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S0 =
∫
dKαP(α)
[
−
∫
dDxQ(~x|α) log2Q(~x|α)
]
, and (2.49)
S
(a)
1 (N) = −
∫
dKα¯P(α¯) log2
[∫
dKαP (α)e−NDKL(α¯||α)
]
. (2.50)
Here S
(a)
1 is an approximation to S1 that neglects fluctuations ψ. This is the same
as the annealed approximation in the statistical mechanics of disordered systems,
as has been used widely in the study of supervised learning problems (Seung et
al. 1992). Thus we can identify the data sequence ~x1 · · ·~xN with the disorder,
EN(α; {~xi}) with the energy of the quenched system, and DKL(α¯||α) with its an-
nealed analogue.
The extensive term S0, Eq. (2.49), is the average entropy of a distribution in
our family of possible distributions, generalizing the result of Eq. (2.39). The
subextensive terms in the entropy are controlled by the N dependence of the
partition function
Z(α¯;N) =
∫
dKαP(α) exp [−NDKL(α¯||α)] , (2.51)
and S1(N) = −〈log2 Z(α¯;N)〉α¯ is analogous to the free energy. Since what is
important in this integral is the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between dif-
ferent distributions, it is natural to ask about the density of models that are KL
divergence D away from the target α¯,
ρ(D; α¯) =
∫
dKαP(α)δ[D −DKL(α¯||α)]; (2.52)
note that this density could be very different for different targets. The density
of divergences is normalized because the original distribution over parameter
space, P (α), is normalized,
∫
dDρ(D; α¯) =
∫
dKαP(α) = 1. (2.53)
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Finally, the partition function takes the simple form
Z(α¯;N) =
∫
dDρ(D; α¯) exp[−ND]. (2.54)
We recall that in statistical mechanics the partition function is given by
Z(β) =
∫
dEρ(E) exp[−βE], (2.55)
where ρ(E) is the density of states that have energy E, and β is the inverse tem-
perature. Thus the subextensive entropy in our learning problem is analogous to
a system in which energy corresponds to the Kullback–Leibler divergence rela-
tive to the target model, and temperature is inverse to the number of examples.
As we increase the length N of the time series we have observed, we “cool” the
system and hence probe models which approach the target; the dynamics of this
approach is determined by the density of low energy states, that is the behavior
of ρ(D; α¯) as D → 0.
The structure of the partition function is determined by a competition be-
tween the (Boltzmann) exponential term, which favors models with smallD, and
the density term, which favors values of D that can be achieved by the largest
possible number of models. Because there (typically) are many parameters, there
are very few models with D → 0. This picture of competition between the Boltz-
mann factor and a density of states has been emphasized in previous work on
supervised learning (Haussler et al. 1996).
The behavior of the density of states, ρ(D; α¯), at smallD is related to the more
intuitive notion of dimensionality. In a parameterized family of distributions, the
Kullback–Leibler divergence between two distributions with nearby parameters
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is approximately a quadratic form,
DKL(α¯||α) ≈ 1
2
∑
µν
(α¯µ − αµ)Fµν(α¯ν − αν) + · · · , (2.56)
where F is the Fisher information matrix. Intuitively, if we have a reasonable
parameterization of the distributions, then similar distributions will be nearby
in parameter space, and more importantly points that are far apart in parameter
space will never correspond to similar distributions; Clarke and Barron (1990)
refer to this condition as the parameterization forming a “sound” family of dis-
tributions. If this condition is obeyed, then we can approximate the low D limit
of the density ρ(D; α¯):
ρ(D; α¯) =
∫
dKαP(α)δ[D −DKL(α¯||α)]
≈
∫
dKαP(α)δ
[
D − 1
2
∑
µν
(α¯µ − αµ)Fµν(α¯ν − αν)
]
=
∫
dKαP(α¯+ U · ξ)δ
[
D − 1
2
∑
µ
Λµξ
2
µ
]
, (2.57)
where U is a matrix that diagonalizes F ,
(UT · F · U)µν = Λµδµν . (2.58)
The delta function restricts the components of ξ in Eq. (2.57) to be of order
√
D or
less, and so if P (α) is smooth we can make a perturbation expansion. After some
algebra the leading term becomes
ρ(D → 0; α¯) ≈ P(α¯) 2π
K/2
Γ(K/2)
(detF)−1/2D(K−2)/2. (2.59)
Here, as before, K is the dimensionality of the parameter vector. Computing the
partition function from Eq. (2.54), we find
Z(α¯;N →∞) ≈ f(α¯) · Γ(K/2)
NK/2
, (2.60)
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where f(α¯) is some function of the target parameter values. Finally, this allows
us to evaluate the subextensive entropy, from Eqs. (2.50, 2.51):
S
(a)
1 (N) = −
∫
dKα¯P(α¯) log2 Z(α¯;N) (2.61)
→ K
2
log2N + · · · (bits), (2.62)
where · · · are finite as N → ∞. Thus, general K–parameter model classes have
the same subextensive entropy as for the simplest example considered in the pre-
vious section. To the leading order, this result is independent even of the prior
distribution P(α) on the parameter space, so that the predictive information
seems to count the number of parameters under some very general conditions
[cf. Fig. (2.3) for a numerical example of the logarithmic behavior].
Although Eq. (2.62) is true under a wide range of conditions, this cannot be
the whole story. Much of modern learning theory is concerned with the fact
that counting parameters is not quite enough to characterize the complexity of
a model class; the naive dimension of the parameter space K should be viewed
in conjunction with the Vapnik–Chervonenkis (VC) dimension dVC (also known
as the pseudodimension) and the phase space dimension d. The phase space di-
mension is defined in the usual way through the scaling of volumes in the model
space (see, for example, Opper 1994). On the other hand, dVC measures not vol-
umes, but capacity of the model class, and its definition is a bit trickier: for a set
of binary (indicator) functions F (~x,α), VC dimension is defined as the maximal
number of vectors ~x1 · · ·~xdVC that can be classified into two different classes in
all 2dVC possible ways using this set of functions. Similarly, for real–valued func-
tions F (~x,α) one can first define a complete set of indicators using step functions,
θ [F (~x,α)− β], and then the VC dimension of this set is the VC dimension of the
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real–valued functions (Vapnik 1998). Separation of a vector in all possible ways is
called shattering, and hence another name for the VC dimension—the shattering
dimension.
Both d and dVC can differ from the number of parameters in several ways. One
possibility is that dVC is infinite when the number of parameters is finite, a prob-
lem discussed below. Another possibility is that the determinant of F is zero,
and hence dVC and d are both smaller than the number of parameters because we
have adopted a redundant description. It is possible that this sort of degeneracy
occurs over a finite fraction but not all of the parameter space, and this is one way
to generate an effective fractional dimensionality. One can imagine multifractal
models such that the effective dimensionality varies continuously over the pa-
rameter space, but it is not obvious where this would be relevant. Finally, models
with d < dVC <∞ are also possible [see, for example, Opper (1994)], and this list
probably is not exhaustive.
The calculation above, Eq. (2.59), lets us actually define the phase space dimen-
sion through the exponent in the small DKL behavior of the model density,
ρ(D → 0; α¯) ∝ D(d−2)/2, (2.63)
and then d appears in place of K as the coefficient of the log divergence in S1(N)
(Clarke and Barron 1990, Opper 1994). However, this simple conclusion can fail
in two ways. First, it can happen that a macroscopic weight gets accumulated
at some nonzero value of DKL, so that the small DKL behavior is irrelevant for
the large N asymptotics. Second, the fluctuations neglected here may be uncon-
trollably large, so that the asymptotics are never reached. Since controllability of
fluctuations is a function of dVC (see Vapnik 1998 and later in this paper), we may
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summarize this in the following way. Provided that the smallDKL behavior of the
density function is the relevant one, the coefficient of the logarithmic divergence
of Ipred measures the phase space or the scaling dimension d and nothing else.
This asymptote is valid, however, only for N ≫ dVC. It is still an open question
whether the two pathologies that can violate this asymptotic behavior are related.
2.4.3 Learning a parameterized process
Consider a process where samples are not independent, and our task is to learn
their joint distributionQ(~x1, · · · , ~xN|α). Again,α is an unknown parameter vector
which is chosen randomly at the beginning of the series. If α is a K dimensional
vector, then one still tries to learn just K numbers and there are still N examples,
even if there are correlations. Therefore, although such problems are much more
general than those considered above, it is reasonable to expect that the predictive
information is still measured by (K/2) log2N provided that some conditions are
met.
One might suppose that conditions for simple results on the predictive in-
formation are very strong, for example that the distribution Q is a finite order
Markov model. In fact all we really need are the following two conditions:
S [{~xi}|α] ≡ −
∫
dN~xQ({~xi}|α) log2Q({~xi}|α)
→ NS0 + S∗0 ; S∗0 = O(1) , (2.64)
DKL [Q({~xi}|α¯)||Q({~xi}|α)] → NDKL (α¯||α) + o(N) . (2.65)
Here the quantities S0, S∗0 , and DKL (α¯||α) are defined by taking limits N → ∞
in both equations. The first of the constraints limits deviations from extensivity
to be of order unity, so that if α is known there are no long range correlations
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in the data—all of the long range predictability is associated with learning the
parameters.5 The second constraint, Eq. (2.65), is a less restrictive one, and it
ensures that the “energy” of our statistical system is an extensive quantity.
With these conditions it is straightforward to show that the results of the pre-
vious subsection carry over virtually unchanged. With the same cautious state-
ments about fluctuations and the distinction between K, d, and dVC, one arrives
at the result:
S(N) = S0 ·N + S(a)1 (N) , (2.66)
S
(a)
1 (N) =
K
2
log2N + · · · (bits), (2.67)
where · · · stands for terms of order one. Note again that for the results Eq. (2.67)
to be valid, the process considered is not required to be a finite order Markov pro-
cess. Memory of all previous outcomes may be kept, provided that the accumu-
lated memory does not contribute a divergent term to the subextensive entropy.
It is interesting to ask what happens if the condition in Eq. (2.64) is vio-
lated, so that there are long range correlations even in the conditional distribution
Q(~x1, · · · , ~xN|α). Suppose, for example, that S∗0 = (K∗/2) log2N . Then the subex-
tensive entropy becomes
S
(a)
1 (N) =
K +K∗
2
log2N + · · · (bits). (2.68)
We see the that the subextensive entropy makes no distinction between predicta-
bility that comes from unknown parameters and predictability that comes from
intrinsic correlations in the data; in this sense, two models with the sameK +K∗
5Suppose that we observe a Gaussian stochastic process and we try to learn the power spec-
trum. If the class of possible spectra includes ratios of polynomials in the frequency (rational
spectra) then this condition is met. On the other hand, if the class of possible spectra includes 1/f
noise, then the condition may not be met. For more on long range correlations, see below.
2.4. Learning and predictability 38
are equivalent. This, actually, must be so. As an example, consider a chain of
Ising spins with long range interactions in one dimension. This system can order
(magnetize) and exhibit long range correlations, and so the predictive informa-
tion will diverge at the transition to ordering. In one view, there is no global pa-
rameter analogous toα, just the long range interactions. On the other hand, there
are regimes in which we can approximate the effect of these interactions by say-
ing that all the spins experience a mean field which is constant across the whole
length of the system, and then formally we can think of the predictive informa-
tion as being carried by the mean field itself. In fact there are situations in which
this is not just an approximation, but an exact statement. Thus we can trade a de-
scription in terms of long range interactions (K∗ 6= 0, butK = 0) for one in which
there are unknown parameters describing the system but given these parameters
there are no long range correlations (K 6= 0, K∗ = 0). The two descriptions are
equivalent, and this is captured by the subextensive entropy.6
2.4.4 Taming the fluctuations: finite dVC case
The preceding calculations of the subextensive entropy S1 are worthless unless
we prove that the fluctuations ψ are controllable. In this subsection we are going
to discuss when and if this, indeed, happens. We limit the discussion to the anal-
ysis of fluctuations in the case of finding a probability density (Section 2.4.2); the
case of learning a process (Section 2.4.3) is very similar.
Clarke and Barron (1990) solved essentially the same problem. They did not
make a separation into the annealed and the fluctuation term, and the quantity
6There are a number of interesting questions about how the coefficients in the diverging pre-
dictive information relate to the usual critical exponents, and we hope to return to this problem
in a later paper.
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they were interested in was a bit different from ours, but, interpreting loosely,
they proved that, modulo some reasonable technical assumptions on differen-
tiability of functions in question, the fluctuation term always approaches zero.
However, they did not investigate the speed of this approach, and we believe
that, by doing so, they missed some important qualitative distinctions between
different problems that can arise due to a difference between d and dVC. In or-
der to illuminate these distinctions, we here go through the trouble of analyzing
fluctuations all over again.
Returning to Eqs. (2.44, 2.46) and the definition of entropy, we can write the
entropy S(N) exactly as
S(N) = −
∫
dKα¯P(α¯)
∫ N∏
j=1
[d~xjQ(~xj|α¯)]
× log2
[
N∏
i=1
Q(~xi|α¯)
∫
dKαP(α) e−NDKL(α¯||α)+Nψ(α,α¯;{~xi})
]
. (2.69)
This expression can be decomposed into the terms identified above, plus a new
contribution to the subextensive entropy that comes from the fluctuations alone,
S
(f)
1 (N):
S(N) = S0 ·N + S(a)1 (N) + S(f)1 (N), (2.70)
S
(f)
1 = −
∫
dKα¯P(α¯)
N∏
j=1
[d~xjQ(~xj|α¯)]
× log2
[∫ dKαP(α)
Z(α¯;N)
e−NDKL(α¯||α)+Nψ(α,α¯;{~xi})
]
, (2.71)
where ψ is defined as in Eq. (2.46), and Z as in Eq. (2.51).
Some loose but useful bounds can be established. First, the predictive infor-
mation is a positive (semidefinite) quantity, and so the fluctuation term may not
be smaller than the value of −S(a)1 as calculated in Eqs. (2.62, 2.67). Second, since
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fluctuations make it more difficult to generalize from samples, the predictive in-
formation should always be reduced by fluctuations, so that S(f) is negative. This
last statement corresponds to the fact that for the statistical mechanics of disor-
dered systems, the annealed free energy always is less than the average quenched
free energy, and may be proven rigorously by applying Jensen’s inequality to the
(concave) logarithm function in Eq. (2.71); essentially the same argument was
given by Opper and Haussler (1995). A related Jensen’s inequality argument al-
lows us to show that the total S1(N) is bounded,
S1(N) ≤ N
∫
dKα
∫
dKα¯P(α)P(α¯)DKL(α¯||α)
≡ 〈DKL(α¯||α)〉α¯,α, (2.72)
so that if we have a class of models (and a prior P(α)) such that the average
Kullback–Leibler divergence among pairs of models is finite, then the subexten-
sive entropy is necessarily properly defined. Note that 〈DKL(α¯||α)〉α¯,α includes
S0 as one of its terms, so that usually S0 and S1 are well– or ill–defined together.
Tighter bounds require nontrivial assumptions about the classes of distribu-
tions considered. The fluctuation term would be zero if ψ were zero, and ψ is the
difference between an expectation value (KL divergence) and the corresponding
empirical mean. There is a broad literature that deals with this type of difference
(see, for example, Vapnik 1998).
We start with the case when the pseudo-dimension (dVC) of the set of proba-
bility densities {Q(~x|α)} is finite. Then for any reasonable function F (~x; β), de-
viations of the empirical mean from the expectation value can be bounded by
probabilistic bounds of the form
P
{
sup
β
∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
∑
j F (~xj; β)−
∫
d~xQ(~x|α¯)F (~x; β)
L[F ]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ǫ
}
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< M(ǫ, N, dVC)e
−cNǫ2 , (2.73)
where c and L[F ] depend on the details of the particular bound used. Typically,
c is a constant of order one, and L[F ] is either some moment of F or the range
of its variation. In our case, F is the log–ratio of two densities, so that L[F ]
may be assumed bounded for almost all β without loss of generality in view
of Eq. (2.72). In addition, M(ǫ, N, dVC) is finite at zero, grows at most subexpo-
nentially in its first two arguments, and depends exponentially on dVC. Bounds
of this form may have different names in different contexts: Glivenko–Cantelli,
Vapnik–Chervonenkis, Hoeffding, Chernoff, ...; for review see Vapnik (1998) and
the references therein.
To start the proof of finiteness of S
(f)
1 in this case, we first show that only
the region α ≈ α¯ is important when calculating the inner integral in Eq. (2.71).
This statement is equivalent to saying that at large values of α − α¯ the KL di-
vergence almost always dominates the fluctuation term, that is, the contribution
of sequences of {~xi} with atypically large fluctuations is negligible (atypicality
is defined as ψ ≥ δ, where δ is some small constant independent of N). Since
the fluctuations decrease as 1/
√
N [see Eq. (2.73)], and DKL is of order one, this
is plausible. To show this, we bound the logarithm in Eq. (2.71) by N times the
supremum value of ψ. Then we realize that the averaging over α¯ and {~xi} is
equivalent to integration over all possible values of the fluctuations. The worst
case density of the fluctuations may be estimated by differentiating Eq. (2.73)
with respect to ǫ (this brings down an extra factor of Nǫ). Thus the worst case
contribution of these atypical sequences is
S
(f),atypical
1 ∼
∫ ∞
δ
dǫN2ǫ2M(ǫ)e−cNǫ
2 ∼ e−cNδ2 ≪ 1 for large N. (2.74)
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This bound lets us focus our attention on the region α ≈ α¯. We expand the
exponent of the integrand of Eq. (2.71) around this point and perform a simple
Gaussian integration. In principle, large fluctuations might lead to an instability
(positive or zero curvature) at the saddle point, but this is atypical and therefore
is accounted for already. Curvatures at the saddle points of both numerator and
denominator are of the same order, and throwing away unimportant additive
and multiplicative constants of order unity, we obtain the following result for the
contribution of typical sequences:
S
(f),typical
1 ∼
∫
dKα¯P(α¯) dN~x∏
j
Q(~xj|α¯) N (BA−1B) ; (2.75)
Bµ =
1
N
∑
i
∂ logQ(~xi|α¯)
∂α¯µ
, 〈B〉~x = 0 ;
(A)µν = 1
N
∑
i
∂2 logQ(~xi|α¯)
∂α¯µ∂α¯ν
, 〈A〉~x = F .
Here 〈· · ·〉~x means an averaging with respect to all ~xi’s keeping α¯ constant. One
immediately recognizes that B and A are, respectively, first and second deriva-
tives of the empirical KL divergence that was in the exponent of the inner integral
in Eq. (2.71).
We are dealing now with typical cases. Therefore, large deviations of A from
F are not allowed, andwemay bound Eq. (2.75) by replacingA−1 withF−1(1+δ),
where δ again is independent ofN . Now we have to average a bunch of products
like
∂ logQ(~xi|α¯)
∂α¯µ
(F−1)µν ∂ logQ(~xj|α¯)
∂α¯ν
(2.76)
over all ~xi’s. Only the terms with i = j survive the averaging. There areK
2N such
terms, each contributing of order N−1. This means that the total contribution of
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the typical fluctuations is bounded by a number of order one and does not grow
with N . This concludes the proof of controllability of fluctuations for dVC <∞.
2.4.5 Taming the fluctuations: the role of the prior
One may notice that we never used the specific form of M(ǫ, N, dVC), which is
the only thing dependent on the precise value of the dimension. Actually, a more
thorough look at the proof shows that we do not even need the strict uniform
convergence enforced by the Glivenko–Cantelli bound. With some modifications
the proof should still hold if there exist some a priori improbable values of α and
α¯ that lead to violation of the bound. That is, if the prior P(α) has sufficiently
narrow support, then we may still expect fluctuations to be unimportant even for
VC–infinite problems.
To see this, consider two examples. A variable x is distributed according to
the following probability density functions:
Q(x|α) = 1√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(x− α)2
]
, x ∈ (−∞; +∞) ; (2.77)
Q(x|α) = exp (− sinαx)∫ 2π
0 dx exp (− sinαx)
, x ∈ [0; 2π) . (2.78)
Learning the parameter in the first case is a dVC = 1 problem, while in the sec-
ond case dVC = ∞. In the first example, as we have shown above, one may
construct a uniform bound on fluctuations irrespective of the prior P(α). The
second one does not allow this. Indeed, suppose that the prior is uniform in a
box 0 < α < αmax, and zero elsewhere, with αmax rather large. Then for not too
many sample points N , the data would be better fitted not by some value in the
vicinity of the actual parameter, but by some much larger value, for which almost
all data points are at the crests of − sinαx. Adding a new data point would not
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help, until that best, but wrong, parameter estimate is less than αmax.
7 So the
fluctuations are large, and the predictive information is small in this case. Even-
tually, however, data points would overwhelm the box size, and the best esti-
mate of α would swiftly approach the actual value. At this point the argument of
Clarke and Barron (1990) would become applicable, and the leading behavior of
the subextensive entropy would converge to its asymptotic value of (1/2) logN .
On the other hand, there is no uniform bound on the value of N for which this
convergence will occur—it is guaranteed only for N ≫ dVC, which is never true
if dVC = ∞. For some sufficiently wide priors this asymptotically correct behav-
ior would be never reached in practice. Further, if we imagine a thermodynamic
limit where the box size and the number of samples both become large, then by
analogy with problems in supervised learning (Seung et al. 1992, Haussler et al.
1996) we expect that there can be sudden changes in performance as a function of
the number of examples. The arguments of Clarke and Barron cannot encompass
these phase transitions or “aha!” phenomena.
Following the intuition inferred from this example, we can now proceed with
a more formal analysis. As the above argument about the smallness of fluctua-
tions in the finite dVC case paralleled the discussion of the Empirical Risk Mini-
mization (ERM) approach (Vapnik 1998), this present argument closely resembles
some statements of the Structural RiskMinimization (SRM) theory (Vapnik 1998),
which deals with the case of dVC = ∞ or, equivalently, N/dVC < 1. While ERM
solves the problem of uniform non–Bayesian learning, there seems to be a general
7Interestingly, since for the model Eq. (2.78) KL divergence is bounded from below and above,
for αmax → ∞ the weight in ρ(D; α¯) at small DKL vanishes, and a finite weight accumulates at
some nonzero value of D. Thus, even putting the fluctuations aside, the asymptotic behavior
based on the phase space dimension is invalidated, as mentioned above.
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agreement that SRM theory is a solution to the problem of learning with a prior.
However, to our knowledge, no explicit identification of why this is so has been
done, so we try to do it here.
Suppose that, as in the above example, admissible solutions of a learning
problem belong to some subset C1 of the whole K–dimensional parameter space
C. Suppose also that for any finite C1 the VC dimension of the correspond-
ing learning problem, dVC(C1), is finite, but dVC(C) = ∞. In SRM theory a
nested set of such subspaces C1 ⊂ C2 ⊂ C3 ⊂ · · · is called a structure C if
C =
⋃
Cn. Each Cn is known as a structure element. Since the subsets are nested,
dVC(C1) ≤ dVC(C2) ≤ dVC(C3) ≤ · · ·. We know that these are the large VC di-
mensions and, therefore, parameters that belong to the large structure elements
Cn, n → ∞, that are responsible for large fluctuations. But in view of Eq. (2.53),
for any properly defined prior P(α), very large values of α are a priori improb-
able. Thus the fight between the prior and the data may result in an effective
cutoff n∗, so that all Cn, n > n
∗, contribute little to S
(f)
1 , and the fluctuations are
controlled.
Indeed, let’s form a structure by assigning all α’s for which − logP(α) +
max logP ≤ n to the element Cn (n is not necessarily integer). This imposes
an a priori probability ν(n) on the elements themselves. Now we can bound
the internal integral in Eq. (2.71) by replacing ψ(α, α¯, {~xi}) with ψn(α¯, {~xi})—its
maximal value on the smallest element Cn that includes α. If the logarithm of the
a priori probability ν(n) falls off faster than Nψn(α¯, {~xi}) increases as n grows,
then one can select a particular n∗, for which the integral over all Cn, n > n
∗, is
smaller than any predefined δ. Effectively n∗ then serves as a cutoff. Note that,
since fluctuations enter multiplied by N , n∗(N) is a nondecreasing function. If it
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grows in a way such that dVC(Cn∗) is sublinear in N (∼ N/ logN suffices), then
M(ǫ, N, dVC) is still subexponential, and we can use the proofs of the preceding
section to show that the fluctuations are controllable. The only difference that
occurs is that the contribution of typical fluctuations is dominated by a saddle
point near αcl, which solves the equation
∂
∂αµ
∣∣∣∣∣
αcl
[− logP(α) +ND(α¯||α)] = 0. (2.79)
If α¯ is only in very large structure elements that contribute little to the internal
integral of Eq. (2.71), then αcl may be quite far from α¯. That is, the best estimate
of α¯ may be imprecise at any finite N . This is particularly important in the case
of nonparametric learning (see Sections 2.4.7, 3.5).
In finite dimensional cases similar to the above example, everyCn, n <∞, has
finite VC dimension dVC, and this dimension is bounded from above by the phase
space dimension d. Themagnitude of fluctuations dependsmostly on dVC. There-
fore, beyond some n∗(N) for which dVC(Cn∗) = d, the fluctuations will practically
stop growing. This means that any proper prior P , however slowly decreasing at
infinities, is enough to impose a finite cutoff and render fluctuations finite. This
is in complete agreement with Clark and Barron—but prior-dependent.
We want to emphasize again that, in general, fluctuations are controlled only
if two related, but not equivalent, assumptions are true. First, for any finite N
there has to be a finite cutoff n∗(N). This means that P(α) is narrow enough
to define a valid structure. Second, for the fluctuations within Cn∗ to be small,
dVC(Cn∗(N)) must grow sublinearly in N .
8 In this case the number of samples
8Actually, the n∗-dependence of the factors similar to L[F ], defined above, may require a dif-
ferent, yet slower, growth [see Vapnik (1998) for details]. But this is outside the scope of this
discussion.
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eventually outgrows the current VC dimension by an arbitrarily large factor, and
determination of parameters is possible to any precision. Both of these conditions
are well known in SRM theory (Vapnik 1998).
In the classical SRM theory, only selection of the law n∗ = n∗(N) is a part of
the problem, and the structure is usually assumed to be given. Ideally, this law
is selected by minimizing the expected error of learning, which consists of uncer-
tainties due to the limited set of allowed solutions (n∗ < ∞) and due to the fluc-
tuations within this set. These uncertainties behave oppositely as n∗ increases. If
calculating the expected error is difficult, people may be content with even pre-
selecting the law n∗ = n∗(N), and then every law for which the VC dimension
grows sublinearly does the job—better or worse—just as we have shown above.
In our current treatment the structure and the law of the VC dimension growth are
both a result of the prior. If the prior is appropriate, then so are the structure and
the law. If not, then learning with this prior is impossible. On general grounds,
we know that when the prior correctly embodies the a priori knowledge, it re-
sults in the fastest average learning possible. Therefore we are guaranteed that, on
average, the law n∗ = n∗(N) is optimal if this law is imposed by the prior (see
Sections 3.4, 3.5 for more on this).
Summarizing, we note that while much of learning theory has properly fo-
cused on problems with finite VC dimension, it might be that the conventional
scenario in which the number of examples eventually overwhelms the number
of parameters or dimensions is too weak to deal with many real world prob-
lems. Certainly in the present context there is not only a quantitative, but also a
qualitative difference between reaching the asymptotic regime in just a few mea-
surements, or in many millions of them. Finitely parameterizable models with
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finite or infinite dVC fall in essentially different universality classes with respect to
the predictive information.
2.4.6 Beyond finite parameterization: general considerations
The previous sections have considered learning from time series where the un-
derlying class of possible models is described with a finite number of parameters.
If the number of parameters is not finite then in principle it is impossible to learn
anything unless there is some appropriate regularization of the problem. If we
let the number of parameters stay finite but become large, then there is more to
be learned and correspondingly the predictive information grows in proportion
to this number, as in Eq. (2.62). On the other hand, if the number of parameters
becomes infinite without regularization, then the predictive information should
go to zero since nothing can be learned. We should be able to see this happen in
a regularized problem as the regularization weakens: eventually the regulariza-
tion would be insufficient and the predictive information would vanish. The only
way this can happen is if the subextensive term in the entropy grows more and
more rapidly with N as we weaken the regularization, until finally it becomes
extensive at the point where learning becomes impossible. More precisely, if this
scenario for the breakdown of learning is to work, there must be situations in
which the predictive information grows with N more rapidly than the logarith-
mic behavior found in the case of finite parameterization.
Subextensive terms in the entropy are controlled by the density of models as
function of their Kullback–Leibler divergence to the target model. If the models
have finite VC and phase space dimensions then this density vanishes for small
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divergences as ρ ∼ D(d−2)/2. Phenomenologically, if we let the number of param-
eters increase, the density vanishes more and more rapidly. We can imagine that
beyond the class of finitely parameterizable problems there is a class of regular-
ized infinite dimensional problems in which the density ρ(D → 0) vanishes more
rapidly than any power of D. As an example, we could have
ρ(D → 0) ≈ A exp
[
− B
Dµ
]
, µ > 0; (2.80)
that is, an essential singularity at D = 0. For simplicity we assume that the con-
stantsA andB can depend on the target model, but that the nature of the essential
singularity (µ) is the same everywhere. Before providing an explicit example, let
us explore the consequences of this behavior.
From Eq. (2.54) above, we can write the partition function as
Z(α¯;N) =
∫
dDρ(D; α¯) exp[−ND]
≈ A(α¯)
∫
dD exp
[
−B(α¯)
Dµ
−ND
]
≈ A˜(α¯) exp
[
−1
2
µ+ 2
µ+ 1
lnN − C(α¯)Nµ/(µ+1)
]
, (2.81)
where in the last step we use a saddle point or steepest descent approximation
which is accurate at large N , and the coefficients are
A˜(α¯) = A(α¯)
(
2πµ1/(µ+1)
µ+ 1
)1/2
· [B(α¯)]1/(2µ+2) (2.82)
C(α¯) = [B(α¯)]1/(µ+1)
(
1
µµ/(µ+1)
+ µ1/(µ+1)
)
. (2.83)
Finally we can use Eqs. (2.61, 2.81) to compute the subextensive term in the en-
tropy, keeping only the dominant term at large N ,
S
(a)
1 (N)→
1
ln 2
〈C(α¯)〉α¯Nµ/(µ+1) (bits), (2.84)
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where 〈· · ·〉α¯ denotes an average over all the target models.
This behavior of the first subextensive term is qualitatively different from ev-
erything we have observed so far. A power law divergence is much stronger than
a logarithmic one. Therefore, a lot more predictive information is accumulated
in an “infinite parameter” (or nonparametric) system; the system is much richer
and more complex, both intuitively and quantitatively.
Subextensive entropy also grows as a power law in a finitely parameterizable
system with a growing number of parameters [compare to the spin chain with
decaying interactions on Fig. (2.3)]. For example, suppose that we approximate
the distribution of a random variable by a histogram with K bins, and we let K
grow with the quantity of available samples as K ∼ Nν . Equation (2.62) sug-
gests that in a K–parameter system, the N th sample point contributes ∼ K/2N
bits to the subextensive entropy. If K changes as mentioned, the N th example
then carries ∼ Nν−1 bits. Summing this up over all samples, we find S(a)1 ∼ Nν ,
and if we let ν = µ/(µ + 1) we obtain Eq. (2.84). Note that the growth of the
number of parameters is slower than N (ν = µ/(µ + 1) < 1), which makes sense
both intuitively and within the framework of the above SRM fluctuation analysis.
Indeed, this growing number of parameters is nothing but expanding structure
elements, and dVC increasing with them, dVC(Cn∗(N)) ≡ dVC(N). Therefore, sub-
linear growth is needed for the fluctuation control.
Power law growth of the predictive information illustrates the point made
earlier about the transition from learning more to finally learning nothing as the
class of investigated models becomes more complex. As µ increases, the problem
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becomes richer and more complex, and this is expressed in the stronger diver-
gence of the first subextensive term of the entropy; for fixed large N , the predic-
tive information increases with µ. However, if µ→∞ the problem is too complex
for learning—in our model example the number of bins grows in proportion to
the number of samples, which means that we are trying to find too much detail
in the underlying distribution. As a result, the subextensive term becomes exten-
sive and stops contributing to predictive information. Thus, at least to the leading
order, predictability is lost, as promised.
2.4.7 Beyond finite parameterization: example
The discussion in the previous section suggests that we should look for power–
law behavior of the predictive information in learning problems where rather
than learning ever more precise values for a fixed set of parameters, we learn
a progressively more detailed description—effectively increasing the number of
parameters—as we collect more data. One example of such a problem is learn-
ing the distribution Q(x) for a continuous variable x, but rather than writing a
parametric form of Q(x) we assume only that this function itself is chosen from
some distribution that enforces a degree of smoothness. There are some natu-
ral connections of this problem to the methods of quantum field theory (Bialek,
Callan, and Strong 1996) which we can exploit to give a complete calculation of
the predictive information, at least for a class of smoothness constraints.
We write Q(x) = (1/l0) exp[−φ(x)] so that positivity of the distribution is au-
tomatic, and then smoothness may be expressed by saying that the ‘energy’ (or
action) associatedwith a function φ(x) is related to an integral over its derivatives,
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like the strain energy in a stretched string. The simplest possibility following this
line of ideas is that the distribution of functions is given by
P[φ(x)] = 1Z exp
− l
2
∫
dx
(
∂φ
∂x
)2 δ [ 1
l0
∫
dx e−φ(x) − 1
]
, (2.85)
where Z is the normalization constant for P[φ], the delta function insures that
each distribution Q(x) is normalized, and l sets a scale for smoothness. If dis-
tributions are chosen from this distribution, then the optimal Bayesian estimate
of Q(x) from a set of samples x1, x2, · · · , xN converges to the correct answer, and
the distribution at finite N is nonsingular, so that the regularization provided
by this prior is strong enough to prevent the development of singular peaks at
the location of observed data points (Bialek, Callan, and Strong 1996) 9. Further
developments of the theory, including alternative choices of P[φ(x)], have been
given by Periwal (1997, 1998), Holy (1997), and Aida (1998). We chose the origi-
nal formulation for our analysis because our goal here is to be illustrative rather
than exhaustive.
From the discussion above we know that the predictive information is related
to the density of Kullback–Leibler divergences, and that the power–law behavior
we are looking for comes from an essential singularity in this density function.
To illustrate this point, we calculate the predictive information using the density,
even though an easier direct way exists.
With Q(x) = (1/l0) exp[−φ(x)], we can write the KL divergence as
DKL[φ¯(x)||φ(x)] = 1
l0
∫
dx exp[−φ¯(x)][φ(x)− φ¯(x)] . (2.86)
9We caution the reader that our discussion in this section is less self–contained than in other
sections. Since the crucial steps exactly parallel those in the earlier work, here we just give refer-
ences. To compensate for this, we compiled a summary of the original results by Bialek et al. in
the Appendix A.1.
2.4. Learning and predictability 53
We want to compute the density,
ρ(D; φ¯) =
∫
[dφ(x)]P[φ(x)]δ
(
D −DKL[φ¯(x)||φ(x)]
)
(2.87)
= M
∫
[dφ(x)]P[φ(x)]δ
(
MD −MDKL[φ¯(x)||φ(x)]
)
, (2.88)
where we introduce a factor M which we will allow to become large so that we
can focus our attention on the interesting limit D → 0. To compute this inte-
gral over all functions φ(x), we introduce a Fourier representation for the delta
function, and then rearrange the terms:
ρ(D; φ¯) = M
∫ dz
2π
exp(izMD)
∫
[dφ(x)]P[φ(x)] exp(−izMDKL) (2.89)
= M
∫
dz
2π
exp
(
izMD +
izM
l0
∫
dxφ¯(x) exp[−φ¯(x)]
)
×
∫
[dφ(x)]P[φ(x)] exp
(
−izM
l0
∫
dxφ(x) exp[−φ¯(x)]
)
. (2.90)
The inner integral over the functions φ(x) is exactly the integral which was evalu-
ated in the original discussion of this problem (Bialek, Callan and Strong 1996); in
the limit that zM is large we can use a saddle point approximation, and standard
field theoretic methods allow us to compute the fluctuations around the saddle
point. The result is that [cf. Eqs. (A.6)–(A.8)]
∫
[dφ(x)]P[φ(x)] exp
(
−izM
l0
∫
dxφ(x) exp[−φ¯(x)]
)
= exp
(
−izM
l0
∫
dxφcl(x) exp[−φ¯(x)]− Seff [φcl(x); zM ]
)
,(2.91)
Seff [φcl; zM ] =
l
2
∫
dx
(
∂φcl
∂x
)2
+
1
2
(
izM
ll0
)1/2 ∫
dx exp[−φcl(x)/2], (2.92)
l∂2xφcl(x) +
izM
l0
exp[−φcl(x)] = izM
l0
exp[−φ¯(x)] . (2.93)
Now we can do the integral over z, again by a saddle point method. The two
saddle point approximations are both valid in the limit thatD → 0 andMD3/2 →
2.4. Learning and predictability 54
∞; we are interested precisely in the first limit, and we are free to set M as we
wish, so this gives us a good approximation for ρ(D → 0; φ¯). Also, since M is
arbitrarily large, φcl(x) = φ¯(x). This results in
ρ(D → 0; φ¯) = A[φ¯(x)]D−3/2 exp
(
−B[φ¯(x)]
D
)
, (2.94)
A[φ¯(x)] =
1√
16πll0
exp
[
− l
2
∫
dx
(
∂xφ¯
)2] ∫
dx exp[−φ¯(x)/2] (2.95)
B[φ¯(x)] =
1
16ll0
(∫
dx exp[−φ¯(x)/2]
)2
. (2.96)
Except for the factor of D−3/2, this is exactly the sort of essential singularity that
we considered in the previous section, with µ = 1. The D−3/2 prefactor does not
change the leading large N behavior of the predictive information, and we find
that
S
(a)
1 (N) ∼
1
2 ln 2
√
ll0
〈∫
dx exp[−φ¯(x)/2]
〉
φ¯
N1/2, (2.97)
where 〈· · ·〉φ¯ denotes an average over the target distributions φ¯(x)weighted once
again by P[φ¯(x)]. Notice that if x is unbounded then the average in Eq. (2.97)
is infrared divergent; if instead we let the variable x range from 0 to L then this
average should be dominated by the uniform distribution. Replacing the average
by its value at this point, we obtain the approximate result
S
(a)
1 (N) ∼
1
2 ln 2
√
N
(
L
l
)1/2
bits. (2.98)
To understand the result in Eq. (2.98), we recall that this field theoretic ap-
proach is more or less equivalent to an adaptive binning procedure in which we
divide the range of x into bins of local size
√
l/NQ(x) (Bialek, Callan, and Strong
1996, see also Appendix A.1). From this point of view, Eq. (2.98) makes perfect
sense: the predictive information is directly proportional to the number of bins
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that can be put in the range of x. This also is in direct accord with a comment from
the previous subsection that power law behavior of predictive information arises
from the number of parameters in the problem depending on the number of sam-
ples. More importantly, since learning a distribution consisting of ∼
√
NL/l bins
is, certainly, a dVC ∼
√
NL/l problem, we can refer back to our discussion of fluc-
tuations in prior controlled learning scenarios (Section 2.4.5) to infer that fluctua-
tions pose no threat to this nonparametric learning setup.
One thing which remains troubling is that the predictive information depends
on the arbitrary parameter l describing the scale of smoothness in the distribu-
tion. In the original work it was proposed that one should integrate over possible
values of l (Bialek, Callan and Strong 1996). Numerical simulations demonstrate
that this parameter can be learned from the data itself (see Chapter 3), but per-
haps even more interesting is a formulation of the problem by Periwal (1997,
1998) which recovers complete coordinate invariance by effectively allowing l to
vary with x. In this case the whole theory has no length scale, and there also is
no need to confine the variable x to a box (here of size L). We expect that this co-
ordinate invariant approach will lead to a universal coefficient multiplying
√
N
in the analog of Eq. (2.98), but this remains to be shown.
In summary, the field theoretic approach to learning a smooth distribution
in one dimension provides us with a concrete, calculable example of a learning
problem with power–law growth of the predictive information. The scenario is
exactly as suggested in the previous section, where the density of KL divergences
develops an essential singularity. Heuristic considerations (Bialek, Callan, and
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Strong 1996; Aida 1999) suggest that different smoothness penalties [for exam-
ple, replacing the kinetic term in the prior, Eq. (2.85), by (∂ηxφ)
2] and generaliza-
tions to higher dimensional problems (dim ~x = ζ) will have sensible effects on the
predictive information
S1(N) ∼ N ζ/2η. (2.99)
This shows a power–law growth. Smoother functions have smaller powers (less
to learn) and higher dimensional problems have larger powers (more to learn)—
but real calculations for these cases remain challenging.
2.5 Ipred as a measure of complexity
The problem of quantifying complexity is very old. Solomonoff (1964), Kol-
mogorov (1965), and Chaitin (1975) investigated a mathematically rigorous no-
tion of complexity that measures (roughly) the minimum length of a computer
program that simulates the observed time series [see also Li and Vita´nyi (1993)].
Unfortunately there is no algorithm that can calculate the Kolmogorov complex-
ity of any data set. In addition, algorithmic or Kolmogorov complexity is closely
related to the Shannon entropy, whichmeans that it measures something closer to
our intuitive concept of randomness than to the intuitive concept of complexity
[as discussed, for example, by Bennett (1990)]. These problems have fueled con-
tinued research along two different paths, representing two major motivations
for defining complexity. First, one would like to make precise an impression that
some systems—such as life on earth or a turbulent fluid flow—evolve toward a
state of higher complexity, and one would like to be able to classify those states.
Second, in choosing among different models that describe an experiment, one
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wants to quantify a preference for simpler explanations or, equivalently, provide
a penalty for complex models that can be weighed against the more conventional
goodness of fit criteria. We bring our readers up to date with some developments
in both of these directions, and then discuss the role of predictive information
as a measure of complexity. This also gives us an opportunity to discuss more
carefully the relation of our results to previous work.
2.5.1 Complexity of statistical models
The construction of complexity penalties for model selection is a statistics prob-
lem. As far as we know, however, the first discussions of complexity in this con-
text belong to philosophical literature. Even leaving aside the early contributions
of William of Occam on the need for simplicity, Hume on the problem of in-
duction, and Popper on falsifiability, Kemeney (1953) suggested explicitly that it
would be possible to create a model selection criterion that balances goodness of
fit versus complexity. Wallace and Burton (1968) hinted that this balance may re-
sult in the model with “the briefest recording of all attribute information.” Even
though he probably had a somewhat different motivation, Akaike (1974a, 1974b)
made the first quantitative step along these lines. His ad hoc complexity term was
independent of the number of data points and was proportional to the number
of free independent parameters in the model.
These ideas were rediscovered and developed systematically by Rissanen in a
series of papers starting from 1978. He has emphasized strongly (Rissanen 1984,
1986, 1987) that fitting a model to data represents an encoding of those data, or
2.5. Ipred as a measure of complexity 58
predicting future data, and that in searching for an efficient code we need to mea-
sure not only the number of bits required to describe the deviations of the data
from the model’s predictions (goodness of fit), but also the number of bits re-
quired to specify the parameters of the model (complexity). This specification
has to be done to a precision supported by the data.10 Rissanen (1984) and Clarke
and Barron (1990) in full generality were able to prove that the optimal encod-
ing of a model requires a code with length asymptotically proportional to the
number of independent parameters and logarithmically dependent on the num-
ber of data points we have observed. The minimal amount of space one needs
to encode a data string (minimum description length or MDL) within a certain
assumed model class was termed by Rissanen stochastic complexity, and in recent
work he refers to the piece of the stochastic complexity required for coding the
parameters as the model complexity (Rissanen 1996). This approach was further
strengthened by a recent result (Vita´nyi and Li 2000) that an estimation of param-
eters using the MDL principle is equivalent to Bayesian parameter estimations
with a “universal” prior (Li and Vita´nyi 1993).
There should be a close connection between Rissanen’s ideas of encoding the
data stream and the subextensive entropy. We are accustomed to the idea that the
average length of a code word for symbols drawn from a distribution P is given
by the entropy of that distribution; thus it is tempting to say that an encoding
of a stream x1, x2, · · · , xN will require an amount of space equal to the entropy
of the joint distribution P (x1, x2, · · · , xN). The situation here is a bit more subtle,
because the usual proofs of equivalence between code length and entropy rely
10Within this framework Akaike’s suggestion can be seen as coding the model to (suboptimal)
fixed precision.
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on notions of typicality and asymptotics as we try to encode sequences of many
symbols; here we already have N symbols and so it doesn’t really make sense to
talk about a stream of streams. One can argue, however, that atypical sequences
are not truly random within a considered distribution since their coding by the
methods optimized for the distribution is not optimal. So atypical sequences are
better considered as typical ones coming from a different distribution [a point
also made by Grassberger (1986)]. This allows us to identify properties of an
observed (long) string with the properties of the distribution it comes from, as
was done by Vita´nyi and Li (2000). If we accept this identification of entropy
with code length, then Rissanen’s stochastic complexity should be the entropy of
the distribution P (x1, x2, · · · , xN ).
As emphasized by Balasubramanian (1996), the entropy of the joint distribu-
tion of N points can be decomposed into pieces that represent noise or errors in
the model’s local predictions—an extensive entropy—and the space required to
encode the model itself, which must be the subextensive entropy. Since in the
usual formulation all long–term predictions are associated with the continued
validity of the model parameters, the dominant component of the subextensive
entropy must be this parameter coding, or model complexity in Rissanen’s ter-
minology. Thus the subextensive entropy should be the model complexity, and
in simple cases where we can describe the data by a K–parameter model both
quantities are equal to (K/2) log2N bits to the leading order.
The fact that the subextensive entropy or predictive information agrees with
Rissanen’s model complexity suggests that Ipred provides a reasonable measure
of complexity in learning problems. On the other hand, this agreement might
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lead the reader to wonder if all we have done is to rewrite the results of Ris-
sanen et al. in a different notation. To calm these fears we recall again that our
approach distinguishes infinite VC problems from finite ones and treats nonpara-
metric cases as well. Indeed, the predictive information is defined without ref-
erence to the idea that we are learning a model, and thus we can make a link to
physical aspects of the problem.
2.5.2 Complexity of dynamical systems
There is a strong prejudice that the complexity of physical systems should be
measured by quantities that are at least related to more conventional thermody-
namic quantities (temperature, entropy, . . .), since this is the only way one will be
able to calculate complexity within the framework of statistical mechanics. Most
proposals define complexity as an entropy–like quantity, but an entropy of some
unusual ensemble. For example, Lloyd and Pagels (1988) identified complexity
as thermodynamic depth, the entropy of the state sequences that lead to the cur-
rent state. The idea is clearly in the same spirit as the measurement of predictive
information, but this depth measure does not completely discard the extensive
component of the entropy (Crutchfield and Shalizi 1999) and thus fails to resolve
the essential difficulty in constructing complexity measures for physical systems:
distinguishing genuine complexity from randomness (entropy), the complexity
should be zero both for purely regular and for purely random systems.
New definitions of complexity that try to satisfy these criteria (Lopez–Ruiz
et al. 1995, Gell–Mann and Lloyd 1996, Shiner et al. 1999, Sole and Luque 1999,
Adami and Cerf 2000) and criticisms of these proposals (Crutchfield et al. 1999,
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Feldman and Crutchfield 1998, Sole and Luque 1999) continue to emerge even
now. Aside from the obvious problems of not actually eliminating the extensive
component for all or a part of the parameter space or not expressing complexity
as an average over a physical ensemble, the critiques often are based on a clever
argument first mentioned explicitly by Feldman and Crutchfield (1998). In an at-
tempt to create a universal measure, the constructions can bemade over–universal:
many proposed complexity measures depend only on the entropy density S0 and
thus are functions only of disorder—not a desired feature. In addition, many of
these and other definitions are flawed because they fail to distinguish among the
richness of classes beyond some very simple ones.
In a series of papers, Crutchfield and coworkers identified statistical complexity
with the entropy of causal states,which in turn are defined as all those microstates
(or histories) that have the same conditional distribution of futures (Crutchfield
and Young 1989, Shalizi and Crutchfield 1999). The causal states provide an op-
timal description of a system’s dynamics in the sense that these states make as
good a prediction as the histories themselves. Statistical complexity is very simi-
lar to predictive information, but Shalizi and Crutchfield (1999) define a quantity
which is even closer to the spirit of our discussion: their excess entropy is exactly
themutual information between the semi–infinite past and future. Unfortunately,
by focusing on cases in which the past and future are infinite but the excess en-
tropy is finite, their discussion is limited to systems for which (in our language)
Ipred(T →∞) = constant.
In our view, Grassberger (1986) has made the clearest and the most appealing
definitions. He emphasized that the slow approach of the entropy to its extensive
limit is a sign of complexity, and has proposed several functions to analyze this
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slow approach. His effective measure complexity is the subextensive entropy term of
an infinite data sample. Unlike Crutchfield et al., he allows this measure to grow
to infinity. As an example, for low dimensional dynamical systems, the effec-
tive measure complexity is finite whether the system exhibits periodic or chaotic
behavior, but at the bifurcation point that marks the onset of chaos, it diverges
logarithmically. More interestingly, Grassberger also notes that simulations of
specific cellular automaton models that are capable of universal computation in-
dicate that these systems can exhibit an even stronger, power–law, divergence.
Grassberger (1986) also introduces the true measure complexity, which is the
minimal information one needs to extract from the past in order to provide opti-
mal prediction. This quantity is exactly the statistical complexity of Crutchfield
et al., and the two approaches are actually much closer than they seem. The re-
lation between the true and the effective measure complexities, or between the
statistical complexity and the excess entropy, closely parallels the idea of extract-
ing or compressing relevant information (Tishby et al. 1999, Bialek and Tishby, in
preparation), as discussed below.
2.5.3 A unique measure of complexity?
We recall that entropy provides a measure of information that is unique in sat-
isfying certain plausible constraints (Shannon 1948). It would be attractive if we
could prove a similar uniqueness theorem for the predictive information, or any
part of it, as a measure of the complexity or richness of a time dependent signal
x(0 < t < T ) drawn from a distribution P [x(t)]. Before proceeding with such
an argument we have to ask, however, whether we want to attach measures of
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complexity to a particular signal x(t), or whether we are interested in measures
(like the entropy itself) which constitute an average over the ensemble P [x(t)].
In most cases, including the learning problems discussed above, it is clear
that we want to measure complexity of the dynamics underlying the signal, or
equivalently the complexity of a model that might be used to describe the signal.
This is very different from trying to define the complexity of a single realization,
because there can be atypical data streams. Either we must treat atypicality ex-
plicitly, arguing that atypical data streams from one source should be viewed as
typical streams from another source, as discussed by Vita´nyi and Li (2000), or we
have to look at average quantities. Grassberger (1986) in particular has argued
that our visual intuition about the complexity of spatial patterns is an ensemble
concept, even if the ensemble is only implicit [see also Tong in the discussion ses-
sion of Rissanen (1987)]. So we shall search for measures of complexity that are
averages over the distribution P [x(t)].
Once we focus on average quantities, we can start by adopting Shannon’s
postulates as constraints on a measure of complexity: if there areN equally likely
signals, then the measure should be monotonic in N ; if the signal is decompos-
able into statistically independent parts then themeasure should be additive with
respect to this decomposition; and if the signal can be described as a leaf on a
tree of statistically independent decisions then the measure should be a weighted
sum of the measures at each branching point. We believe that these constraints
are as plausible for complexity measures as for information measures, and it is
well known from Shannon’s original work that this set of constraints leaves the
entropy as the only possibility. Since we are discussing a time dependent signal,
this entropy depends on the duration of our sample, S(T ). We know of course
2.5. Ipred as a measure of complexity 64
that this cannot be the end of the discussion, because we need to distinguish be-
tween randomness (entropy) and complexity. The path to this distinction is to
introduce other constraints on our measure.
First we notice that if the signal x is continuous, then the entropy is not in-
variant under transformations of x. It seems reasonable to ask that complexity
be a function of the process we are observing and not of the coordinate system
in which we choose to record our observations. The examples above show us,
however, that it is not the whole function S(T )which depends on the coordinate
system for x;11 it is only the extensive component of the entropy that has this non-
invariance. This can be seen more generally by noting that subextensive terms in
the entropy contribute to the mutual information among different segments of
the data stream (including the predictive information defined here), while the ex-
tensive entropy cannot; mutual information is coordinate invariant, so all of the
noninvariance must reside in the extensive term. Thus, any measure complexity
that is coordinate invariant must discard the extensive component of the entropy.
The fact that extensive entropy cannot contribute to complexity is discussed
widely in the physics literature (Bennett 1990), as our short review above shows.
To statisticians and computer scientists, who are used to Kolmogorov’s ideas, this
is less obvious. However, Rissanen (1986, 1987) also talks about “noise” and “use-
ful information” in a data sequence, which is similar to splitting entropy into its
extensive and the subextensive parts. His “model complexity,” aside from not be-
ing an average as required above, is essentially equal to the subextensive entropy.
Similarly, Whittle [in the discussion of Rissanen (1987)] talks about separating the
11Here we consider instantaneous transformations of x, not filtering or other transformations
that mix points at different times.
2.5. Ipred as a measure of complexity 65
predictive part of the data from the rest.
If we continue along these lines, we can think about the asymptotic expansion
of the entropy at large T . The extensive term is the first term in this series, and
we have seen that it must be discarded. What about the other terms? In the con-
text of learning a parameterized model, most of the terms in this series depend
in detail on our prior distribution in parameter space, which might seem odd for
a measure of complexity. More generally, if we consider transformations of the
data stream x(t) that mix points within a temporal window of size τ , then for
T >> τ the entropy S(T ) may have subextensive terms which are constant, and
these are not invariant under this class of transformations. On the other hand, if
there are divergent subextensive terms, these are invariant under such temporally
local transformations.12 So if we insist that measures of complexity be invariant
not only under instantaneous coordinate transformations, but also under tempo-
rally local transformations, then we can discard both the extensive and the finite
subextensive terms in the entropy, leaving only the divergent subextensive terms
as a possible measure of complexity.
An interesting example of these arguments is provided by the statistical me-
chanics of polymers. It is conventional to make models of polymers as random
walks on a lattice, with various interactions or self avoidance constraints among
different elements of the polymer chain. If we count the number N of walks
with N steps, we find that N (N) ∼ ANγzN (de Gennes 1979). Now the entropy
is the logarithm of the number of states, and so there is an extensive entropy
S0 = log2 z, a constant subextensive entropy log2A, and a divergent subextensive
12Throughout this discussion we assume that the signal x at one point in time is finite dimen-
sional. There are subtleties if we allow x to represent the configuration of a spatially infinite
system.
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term S1(N) → γ log2N . Of these three terms, only the divergent subextensive
term (related to the critical exponent γ) is universal, that is independent of the
detailed structure of the lattice. Thus, as in our general argument, it is only the
divergent subextensive terms in the entropy that are invariant to changes in our
description of the local, small scale dynamics.
We can recast the invariance arguments in a slightly different form using the
relative entropy. We recall that entropy is defined cleanly only for discrete pro-
cesses, and that in the continuum there are ambiguities. We would like to write
the continuum generalization of the entropy of a process x(t) distributed accord-
ing to P [x(t)] as
Scont = −
∫
Dx(t)P [x(t)] log2 P [x(t)], (2.100)
but this is not well defined because we are taking the logarithm of a dimensionful
quantity. Shannon gave the solution to this problem: we use as a measure of in-
formation the relative entropy or KL divergence between the distribution P [x(t)]
and some reference distribution Q[x(t)],
Srel = −
∫
Dx(t)P [x(t)] log2
(
P [x(t)]
Q[x(t)]
)
, (2.101)
which is invariant under changes of our coordinate system on the space of sig-
nals. The cost of this invariance is that we have introduced an arbitrary dis-
tribution Q[x(t)], and so really we have a family of measures. We can find a
unique complexity measure within this family by imposing invariance principles
as above, but in this language we must make our measure invariant to different
choices of the reference distribution Q[x(t)].
The reference distribution Q[x(t)] embodies our expectations for the signal
x(t); in particular, Srel measures the extra space needed to encode signals drawn
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from the distribution P [x(t)] if we use coding strategies that are optimized for
Q[x(t)]. If x(t) is a written text, two readers who expect different numbers of
spelling errors will have different Qs, but to the extent that spelling errors can
be corrected by reference to the immediate neighboring letters we insist that any
measure of complexity be invariant to these differences in Q. On the other hand,
readers who differ in their expectations about the global subject of the text may
well disagree about the richness of a newspaper article. This suggests that com-
plexity is a component of the relative entropy that is invariant under some class
of local translations and misspellings.
Suppose that we leave aside global expectations, and construct our reference
distributionQ[x(t)] by allowing only for short ranged interactions—certain letters
tend to follow one another, letters formwords, and so on, but we bound the range
over which these rules are applied. Models of this class cannot embody the full
structure of most interesting time series (including language), but in the present
context we are not asking for this. On the contrary, we are looking for a measure
that is invariant to differences in this short ranged structure. In the terminology
of field theory or statistical mechanics, we are constructing our reference distribu-
tion Q[x(t)] from local operators. Because we are considering a one dimensional
signal (the one dimension being time), distributions constructed from local op-
erators cannot have any phase transitions as a function of parameters; again it is
important that the signal x at one point in time is finite dimensional. The absence
of critical points means that the entropy of these distributions (or their contri-
bution to the relative entropy) consists of an extensive term (proportional to the
time window T ) plus a constant subextensive term, plus terms that vanish as T
becomes large. Thus, if we choose different reference distributions within the
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class constructible from local operators, we can change the extensive component
of the relative entropy, and we can change constant subextensive terms, but the
divergent subextensive terms are invariant.
To summarize, the usual constraints on information measures in the contin-
uum produce a family of allowable complexity measures, the relative entropy
to an arbitrary reference distribution. If we insist that all observers who choose
reference distributions constructed from local operators arrive at the same mea-
sure of complexity, or if we follow the first line of arguments presented above,
then this measure must be the divergent subextensive component of the entropy
or, equivalently, the predictive information. We have seen that this component
is connected to learning, quantifying the amount that can be learned about dy-
namics that generate the signal, and to measures of complexity that have arisen
in statistics and in dynamical systems theory.
2.6 Discussion
We have presented predictive information as a characterization of data streams.
In the context of learning, predictive information is related directly to general-
ization. More generally, the structure or order in a time series or a sequence is
related almost by definition to the fact that there is predictability along the se-
quence. The predictive information measures the amount of such structure, but
doesn’t exhibit the structure in a concrete form. Having collected a data stream
of duration T , what are the features of these data that carry the predictive infor-
mation Ipred(T )? From Eq. (2.9) we know that most of what we have seen over
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the time T must be irrelevant to the problem of prediction, so that the predic-
tive information is a small fraction of the total information; can we separate these
predictive bits from the vast amount of nonpredictive data?
The problem of separating predictive from nonpredictive information is a spe-
cial case of the problem discussed recently (Tishby et al. 1999, Bialek and Tishby,
in preparation): given some data x, how do we compress our description of x
while preserving as much information as possible about some other variable y?
Here we identify x = xpast as the past data and y = xfuture as the future. When we
compress xpast into some reduced description xˆpast we keep a certain amount of
information about the past, I(xˆpast; xpast), and we also preserve a certain amount
of information about the future, I(xˆpast; xfuture). There is no single correct com-
pression xpast → xˆpast; instead there is a one parameter family of strategies which
trace out an optimal curve in the plane defined by these twomutual informations,
I(xˆpast; xfuture) vs. I(xˆpast; xpast).
The predictive information preserved by compression must be less than the
total, so that I(xˆpast; xfuture) ≤ Ipred(T ). Generically no compression can preserve
all of the predictive information so that the inequality will be strict, but there are
interesting special cases where equality can be achieved. If prediction proceeds
by learning a model with a finite number of parameters, we might have a re-
gression formula that specifies the best estimate of the parameters given the past
data; using the regression formula compresses the data but preserves all of the
predictive power. In cases like this (more generally, if there exist sufficient statis-
tics for the prediction problem) we can ask for the minimal set of xˆpast such that
I(xˆpast; xfuture) = Ipred(T ). The entropy of this minimal xˆpast is the true measure
complexity defined by Grassberger (1986) or the statistical complexity defined by
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Crutchfield and Young (1989) [in the framework of the causal states theory a very
similar comment was made recently by Shalizi and Crutchfield (2000)].
In the context of statistical mechanics, long range correlations are charac-
terized by computing the correlation functions of order parameters, which are
coarse–grained functions of the system’s microscopic variables. When we know
something about the nature of the order parameter (e. g., whether it is a vector
or a scalar), then general principles allow a fairly complete classification and de-
scription of long range ordering and the nature of the critical points at which
this order can appear or change. On the other hand, defining the order param-
eter itself remains something of an art. For a ferromagnet, the order parameter
is obtained by local averaging of the microscopic spins, while for an antiferro-
magnet one must average the staggered magnetization to capture the fact that
the ordering involves an alternation from site to site, and so on. Since the order
parameter carries all the information that contributes to long range correlations
in space and time, it might be possible to define order parameters more generally
as those variables that provide the most efficient compression of the predictive
information, and this should be especially interesting for complex or disordered
systems where the nature of the order is not obvious intuitively; a first try in this
direction wasmade by Bruder (1998). At critical points the predictive information
will diverge with the size of the system, and the coefficients of these divergences
should be related to the standard scaling dimensions of the order parameters, but
the details of this connection need to be worked out.
If we compress or extract the predictive information from a time series we are
in effect discovering “features” that capture the nature of the ordering in time.
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Learning itself can be seen as an example of this, where we discover the parame-
ters of an underlying model by trying to compress the information that one sam-
ple of N points provides about the next, and in this way we address directly the
problem of generalization (Bialek and Tishby, in preparation). The fact that (as
mentioned above) nonpredictive information is useless to the organism suggests
that one crucial goal of neural information processing is to separate predictive in-
formation from the background. Perhaps rather than providing an efficient rep-
resentation of the current state of the world—as suggested by Attneave (1954),
Barlow (1959, 1961), and others (Atick 1992)—the nervous system provides an ef-
ficient representation of the predictive information.13 It should be possible to test
this directly by studying the encoding of reasonably natural signals and asking if
the information which neural responses provide about the future of the input is
close to the limit set by the statistics of the input itself, given that the neuron only
captures a certain number of bits about the past. Thus we might ask if, under
natural stimulus conditions, a motion sensitive visual neuron captures features
of the motion trajectory that allow for optimal prediction or extrapolation of that
13If, as seems likely, the streamof data reaching our senses has diverging predictive information
then the space required to write down our description grows and grows as we observe the world
for longer periods of time. In particular, if we can observe for a very long time then the amount
that we know about the future will exceed, by an arbitrarily large factor, the amount that we
know about the present. Thus representing the predictive information may require many more
neurons than would be required to represent the current data. If we imagine that the goal of
primary sensory cortex is to represent the current state of the sensory world, then it is difficult
to understand why these cortices have so many more neurons than they have sensory inputs. In
the extreme case, the region of primary visual cortex devoted to inputs from the fovea has nearly
30,000 neurons for each photoreceptor cell in the retina (Hawken and Parker 1991); although
much remains to be learned about these cells, it is difficult to imagine that the activity of so many
neurons constitutes an efficient representation of the current sensory inputs. But if we live in a
world where the predictive information in the movies reaching our retina diverges, it is perfectly
possible that an efficient representation of the predictive information available to us at one instant
requires thousands of times more space than an efficient representation of the image currently
falling on our retina.
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trajectory; by using information theoretic measures we both test the “efficient
representation” hypothesis directly and avoid arbitrary assumptions about the
metric for errors in prediction. For more complex signals such as communication
sounds, even identifying the features that capture the predictive information is
an interesting problem.
It is natural to ask if these ideas about predictive information could be used to
analyze experiments on learning in animals or humans. We have emphasized the
problem of learning probability distributions or probabilistic models rather than
learning deterministic functions, associations or rules. It is known that the ner-
vous system adapts to the statistics of its inputs, and this adaptation is evident
in the responses of single neurons (Smirnakis et al. 1996, Brenner et al. 2000);
these experiments provide a simple example of the system learning a parameter-
ized distribution. When making saccadic eye movements, human subjects alter
their distribution of reaction times in relation to the relative probabilities of dif-
ferent targets, as if they had learned an estimate of the relevant likelihood ratios
(Carpenter and Williams 1995). Humans also can learn to discriminate almost
optimally between random sequences (fair coin tosses) and sequences that are
correlated or anticorrelated according to a Markov process; this learning can be
accomplished from examples alone, with no other feedback (Lopes and Oden
1987). Acquisition of language may require learning the joint distribution of suc-
cessive phonemes, syllables, or words, and there is direct evidence for learning
of conditional probabilities from artificial sound sequences, both by infants and
by adults (Saffran et al. 1996; 1999). These examples, which are not exhaustive,
indicate that the nervous system can learn an appropriate probabilistic model,14
14As emphasized above, many other learning problems, including learning a function from
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and this offers the opportunity to analyze the dynamics of this learning using in-
formation theoretic methods: What is the entropy of N successive reaction times
following a switch to a new set of relative probabilities in the saccade experi-
ment? How much information does a single reaction time provide about the
relevant probabilities? Following the arguments above, such analysis could lead
to a measurement of the universal learning curve Λ(N).
The learning curve Λ(N) exhibited by a human observer is limited by the pre-
dictive information in the time series of stimulus trials itself. Comparing Λ(N) to
this limit defines an efficiency of learning in the spirit of the discussion by Barlow
(1983); while it is known that the nervous system can make efficient use of avail-
able information in signal processing tasks [cf. Chapter 4 of Rieke et al. (1997)], it
is not known whether the brain is an efficient learning machine in the analogous
sense. Given our classification of learning tasks by their complexity, it would be
natural to ask if the efficiency of learning were a critical function of task complex-
ity: perhaps we can even identify a limit beyond which efficient learning fails,
indicating a limit to the complexity of the internal model used by the brain dur-
ing a class of learning tasks. We believe that our theoretical discussion here at
least frames a clear question about the complexity of internal models, even if for
the present we can only speculate about the outcome of such experiments.
An important result of our analysis is the characterization of time series or
learning problems beyond the class of finitely parameterizable models, that is the
class with power–law divergent predictive information. Qualitatively this class is
more complex than any parametric model, no matter howmany parameters there
noisy examples, can be seen as the learning of a probabilistic model. Thus we expect that this
description applies to a much wider range of biological learning tasks.
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may be, because of the more rapid asymptotic growth of Ipred(N). On the other
hand, with a finite number of observations N , the actual amount of predictive in-
formation in such a nonparametric problem may be smaller than in a model with
a large but finite number of parameters. Specifically, if we have two models, one
with Ipred(N) ∼ ANν and one withK parameters so that Ipred(N) ∼ (K/2) log2N ,
the infinite parameter model has less predictive information for all N smaller
than some critical value
Nc ∼
[
K
2Aν
log2
(
K
2A
)]1/ν
. (2.102)
In the regimeN ≪ Nc, it is possible to achieve more efficient prediction by trying
to learn the (asymptotically) more complex model, as we illustrate concretely in
numerical simulations of the density estimation problem, Section 3.6. Even if
there are a finite number of parameters—such as the finite number of synapses in
a small volume of the brain—this number may be so large that we always have
N ≪ Nc, so that it may be more effective to think of the many parameter model
as approximating a continuous or nonparametric one.
It is tempting to suggest that the regimeN << Nc is the relevant one for much
of biology. If we consider, for example, 10 mm2 of inferotemporal cortex devoted
to object recognition (Logothetis and Sheinberg 1996), the number of synapses is
K ∼ 5 × 109. On the other hand, object recognition depends on foveation, and
we move our eyes roughly three times per second throughout perhaps 15 years
of waking life during which we master the art of object recognition. This limits
us to at most N ∼ 109 examples. Remembering that we must have ν < 1, even
with large values of A Eq. (2.102) suggests that we operate with N < Nc. One
can make similar arguments about very different brains, such as the mushroom
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bodies in insects (Capaldi, Robinson and Fahrbach 1999). If this identification
of biological learning with the regime N << Nc is correct, then the success of
learning in animals must depend on strategies that implement sensible priors
over the space of possible models.
There is one clear empirical hint that humans canmake effective use of models
that are beyond finite parameterization (in the sense that predictive information
diverges as a power–law), and this comes from studies of language. Long ago,
Shannon (1951) used the knowledge of native speakers to place bounds on the
entropy of written English, and his strategy made explicit use of predictability.
Shannon showed N–letter sequences to native speakers (readers), asked them to
guess the next letter, and recorded how many guesses were required before they
got the right answer. Thus each letter in the text is turned into a number, and the
entropy of the distribution of these numbers is an upper bound on the conditional
entropy ℓ(N) [cf. Eq. (2.10)]. Shannon himself thought that the convergence as
N becomes large was rather quick, and quoted an estimate of the extensive en-
tropy per letter S0. Many years later, Hilberg (1990) reanalyzed Shannon’s data
and found that the approach to extensivity in fact was very slow: certainly there
is evidence for a large component S1(N) ∝ N1/2, and this may even dominate
the extensive component for accessible N . Ebeling and Po¨schel (1994; see also
Po¨schel, Ebeling, and Rose´ 1995) studied the statistics of letter sequences in long
texts (like Moby Dick) and found the same strong subextensive component. It
would be attractive to repeat Shannon’s experiments with a slightly different de-
sign that emphasizes the detection of subextensive terms at large N .15
15Associated with the slow approach to extensivity is a large mutual information between
words or characters separated by long distances, and several groups have found that this mu-
tual information declines as a power law. Cover and King (1978) criticize such observations by
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In summary, we believe that our analysis of predictive information solves the
problem of measuring the complexity of time series. This analysis unifies ideas
from learning theory, coding theory, dynamical systems, and statistical mechan-
ics. In particular we have focused attention on a class of processes that are qual-
itatively more complex than those treated in conventional learning theory, and
there are several reasons to think that this class includes many examples of rele-
vance to biology and cognition.
noting that such behavior is impossible in Markov chains of arbitrary order. While it is possi-
ble that existing mutual information data have not reached asymptotia, the criticism of Cover
and King misses the possibility that language is not a Markov process. Of course it cannot be
Markovian if it has a power–law divergence in the predictive information.
Chapter 3
Learning continuous distributions:
Simulations with field theoretic
priors
3.1 Occam factors in statistics
As we have discussed extensively in the preceding Chapter, one of the central
problems in learning is to balance ‘goodness of fit’ criteria against the complexity
of models. An important development in the Bayesian approach thus was the re-
alization that there does not need to be any extra penalty for model complexity:
if we compute the total probability that data are generated by a model, there is a
factor from the volume in parameter space—the “Occam factor”—that discrimi-
nates against more complex models (MacKay 1992, Balasubramanian 1997). This
works remarkably well for systems with a finite number of parameters and cre-
ates a complexity “razor” (named after “Occam’s razor”) that is equivalent to the
model complexity of the celebrated Minimal Description Length (MDL) principle
(Rissanen 1989, 1996). It is not clear, however, what happens if we leave this finite
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dimensional setting and consider nonparametric problems such as the estimation
of a smooth probability density.
As we have emphasized, the behavior of the predictive information, Eq. (2.8),
is controlled by the density of models, and therefore the predictive information
is closely related to the Occam factor. Since the density and consequently Ipred
are well defined for the finite parameter as well as for the nonparametric cases
(cf. Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.6) one can hope that a nonparametric analogue of the
Occam factor exists and can do its job of punishing complexity. However, since
in these two cases the densities of models are very different, the Occam factor
details certainly must be different too.
The 1996 formulation of nonparametric learning by Bialek, Callan, and Strong,
which we have summarized in Appendix A.1 and investigated further in Sec-
tion 2.4.7, may serve as a good example in which to study infinite dimensional
Occam factors. In this Bayesian quantum field theory formulation, standard field
theory methods may be used not only to find a nowhere singular estimate of a
continuous density, but also to compute the infinite dimensional analog of the
Occam factor, at least asymptotically for large numbers of samples. This factor,
which we also call the fluctuation determinant, is the second term of the effective
Hamiltonian Eqs. (A.7, 2.92)
R =
1
2
(
N
ll0
)1/2 ∫
dx exp[−φcl(x)/2]. (3.1)
Intuitively, smaller values of l allowmore rapidly varying and thus more com-
plex [as measured by the predictive information, Eqs. (2.97, 2.98)] estimates of the
density. Correspondingly, the infinite dimensional Occam factor is bigger and
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thus exponentially punishes more complex models. As Bialek et al. have spec-
ulated, l, the only free parameter of their theory, can be determined by a fight
between the log–likelihood goodness of fit and the Occam factor to provide for
the shortest total description (highest probability) of the data, much like in the
finite parameter MDL theory. However, their proposed scaling for l∗ (the best
value of the parameter) as a function of N , l∗ ∼ N1/3 seems to be over–universal
and requires further analysis.
There are more questions not clearly answered either by the original work,
or its further developments (Periwal 1997, 1998, Holy 1997, Aida 1999). Can this
method be implemented in practice? Can we really use the infinite dimensional
Occam factor to balance against the goodness of fit? How does the algorithm’s
performance compare to the absolute bounds set by the predictive information?
What happens if the learning problem is strongly atypical of the prior distribu-
tion? And what is the role of the Occam factor in this case?
To answer all of these questions we turn to numerical simulations.
3.2 The algorithm
To simplify the algorithm, maximize the speed of simulations, and shorten our
presentation, we do the numerical analysis only in the framework of the original
paper (Bialek, Callan, and Strong 1996, see also Appendix A.1 and Section 2.4.7).
This may seem too specific, but we believe that our results are very general and
will hold for the alternative formulations of Periwal (1997, 1998) and Holy (1997)
since the mechanisms of regularization and complexity control are everywhere
the same.
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Due to our most recent developments (cf. Section 2.4.7) and the specific ques-
tions we ask, we need to modify the original setup slightly before proceeding.
First of all, we will investigate the performance of the method in many different
learning problems, some of them not characteristic of the prior Eq. (A.5). For
these purposes we will take densities at random from an ‘actual’ a priori distri-
bution that minimally generalizes Eq. (A.5),
P[φ(x)] = 1Z exp
− l2ηa−1a
2
∫
dx
(
∂ηaφ
∂xηa
)2 δ [ 1
l0
∫
dx e−φ(x) − 1
]
. (3.2)
Here ηa > 1/2 to ensure UV convergence, Z is the normalization constant, and
the δ–function enforces normalization ofQ. We refer to la and ηa as the smoothness
scale and the exponent, respectively, and the subscript a stands for ‘actual’. We will
use non–subscripted η and l to indicate the parameters the algorithm uses, that
is, the learning machine’s own a priori expectations, and then ηa = η ≡ 1 and
la = l reduces to the original formulation of Bialek et al.
The other modification we make relates to the problem of the infrared diver-
gence of the predictive information, Eq. (2.97), or, equivalently, to the nonuniform
convergence of the estimate Qest(x) to the target P (x), Eq. (A.11). To cure this we
can put the system in the box of size L, just like we did in Section 2.4.7. Also,
we realize that the variance of fluctuations between the target and the estimate
(Bialek et al. 1996) is just an ad hoc measure of performance of the learning ma-
chine. The universal learning curve Λ(N), Eq. (2.13), is a much better choice. For a
proper Bayesian learning with the prior Eq. (A.5), using Eqs. (2.51, 2.98), we write
Λ(N) ≡
〈
〈DKL[P (x)||Qest(x)]〉{xi}
〉(0) ∼ 1
4
√
L
lN
, (3.3)
where 〈· · ·〉(0) means an average over the prior, and the log 2 factor is omitted
because we choose to measure entropies in nats (that is, use natural logarithms)
3.2. The algorithm 81
in this Chapter. Note that the coefficient in front of the square root is probably
meaningless since it is calculated here only to the zeroth order (see Section 2.4.7).
After thesemodifications, the algorithm to implement the theory is rather sim-
ple. We need to solve the second order differential equation [cf. Eq. (A.8)]
l∂2xφcl(x) +
N
l0
exp [−φcl(x)] =
N∑
j=1
δ(x− xj) . (3.4)
Normalization of Qcl fixes one integration constant, and the other is set by a peri-
odicity constraint for φcl,
φ(x) = φ(x+ L), (3.5)
which is due to x being in a box. The resulting boundary value problem is solved
by a standard ‘relaxation’ (or Newton) method of iterative improvements to a
guessed solution (see, for example, Press et al. 1988). The target precision is al-
ways 10−5, which is smaller than the smallest DKL ∼ 10−4 we intend to investi-
gate. It turns out that the method converges regardless of the initial guess for all
l up to ∼ 5. However, convergence is not uniform in l and, as l → 0, the number
of iterations required to reach the same precision grows almost quadratically in
1/l. The independent variable x ∈ [0, L] is discretized in equal steps to ensure
stability of the method. We expect the estimate distribution to vary over a local
length scale [Bialek et al. 1996, cf. Eq. (A.9)]
ξ(x) ∼ [l/NQest(x)]1/2 ≈ [l/NP (x)]1/2 . (3.6)
Empirically we see that, for small l, the maximal value of the target distribu-
tion P (x) grows approximately as ∼ l−1/2. This means that for Figs. (3.1–3.4),
where N ≤ 105 and l ≥ 0.05, we are safe with 104 grid points. Similarly, for
Figs. (3.5, 3.6), we need 105 discretization steps because N = 106 and l = 0.01 are
present there.
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Since the prior we use, Eq. (3.2), is UV convergent, we can generate random
probability densities from it by replacing φ with its Fourier series and truncating
the latter at some sufficiently high wavenumber kc,
φ(x) =
kc∑
k=0
[
Ak cos
2πkx
L
+Bk sin
2πkx
L
]
. (3.7)
Then Eq. (3.2) enforces the amplitudes of the k’thmode to be distributed normally
around zero with the standard deviation
〈A2k〉1/2 = 〈B2k〉1/2 =
21/2
lη−1/2
(
L
2πk
)η
, k = 1, 2, · · · . (3.8)
In addition, the amplitude of the zeroth mode, A0, is always set by the normal-
ization constraint. For the same sets of figures, it is enough to have kc = 1000 and
5000 respectively, and then we should see very little effects associated with the
finiteness of kc.
Coded in such a way, the simulations are extremely computationally inten-
sive. Therefore, the Monte Carlo averages given here are only over 500 runs,
and fluctuation determinants are calculated according to Eq. (3.1), but not using
numerical path integration.
3.3 Learning with the correct prior
As an example of the algorithm’s performance, Fig. (3.1) shows one particular
learning run for η = ηa = 1 and l = la = 0.2. We see that singularities and
overfitting are absent even for N as low as 10. Moreover, the approach of Qcl(x)
to the actual distribution P (x) is remarkably fast: for N = 10, they are similar;
for N = 1000, very close; for N = 100000, one needs to look carefully to see the
difference between the two.
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Figure 3.1: Qcl found for different N at l = 0.2.
The next question on our list is the behavior of the learning curves. For the
same η and l = 0.4, 0.2, 0.05, these are shown on Fig. (3.2). One sees that the
exponents are extremely close to the expected 1/2, and the ratios of the prefactors
are within the errors from the predicted scaling ∼ 1/√l. All of this means that
the proposed algorithm for finding densities not only works as predicted, but
is, at most, a constant factor away from being optimal in using the predictive
information of the sample set.
Note also that the data points approach their asymptotic regimes very differ-
ently for different values of l: the bigger l is, the lower the data start compared
to their respective fits. This is explainable in view of the fact that smoother dis-
tributions usually vary over smaller ranges. For example, for l = 0.4 the target
distribution P (x) usually takes values from ∼ 0.5 to ∼ 2. On the other hand, for
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Figure 3.2: Λ as a function of N and l. The best fits are: for l = 0.4, Λ = (0.54 ±
0.07)N−0.483±0.014; for l = 0.2, Λ = (0.83 ± 0.08)N−0.493±0.09; for l = 0.05, Λ =
(1.64± 0.16)N−0.507±0.09.
not too large N the estimates are also smooth and close to being uniform. There-
fore, the KL divergence usually comes out small in this case. Thus the l = 0.4 data
starts so low not because we manage to learn the distribution extremely well for
N = 10, but because almost any guess is as good as any other at this level of
detail.
3.4 Learning with ‘wrong’ priors
We stress first that there is no such thing as a wrong prior. If one admits the
possibility of a prior being wrong, then that prior does not encode all of our
a priori knowledge! It does make sense, however, to ask what happens if the
distribution we are trying to learn is an extreme outlier in the prior P[φ(x)]. One
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Figure 3.3: Λ as a function of N and la. Best fits are: for la = 0.4, Λ = (0.56 ±
0.08)N−0.477±0.015; for la = 0.05, Λ = (1.90 ± 0.16)N−0.502±0.008; for variable la,
Λ = (1.28± 0.13)N−0.498±0.016. In all cases we learn with l = 0.2.
way to generate such an example is to choose a typical function from a different
prior P ′[φ(x)], and this is what we mean by ‘learning with an incorrect prior.’ To
study this we learn using η = 1 and l, but we choose our target distributions from
the prior Eq. (3.2) with different values of ηa and la.
If the prior is wrong in the above sense, and the learning process is as usual,
Eqs. (A.3, A.6–A.8), thenwe still expect the asymptotic behavior, Eq. (3.3), to hold.
Indeed, once φcl becomes close to − logP , it takes the same time to discover that
the distribution’s features at the current relevant scale ξ(N) are as expected, too
big, or almost absent. Thus only the prefactors of Λ should change, and those
must increase because there is an obvious advantage in having the right prior.
We illustrate these points in Figs. (3.3, 3.4).
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Figure (3.3) shows the learning curve for distributions generated with the ‘ac-
tual’ smoothness scale la = 0.4, 0.05 and studied using the ‘learning’ smoothness
scale l = 0.2 (we show the case la = l = 0.2 again as a reference). The Λ ∼ 1/
√
N
behavior is seen unmistakably. The prefactors are a bit larger (unfortunately, in-
significantly) than the corresponding ones from Fig. (3.2), so we may expect that
the ‘right’ l, indeed, provides better learning (see Section 3.5 for a detailed dis-
cussion). Finally, the approach to the asymptotes again is different for the differ-
ent examples considered, but it is still explainable by the argument we used for
Fig. (3.2).
To generate outliers that are even more uncommon than the ones just dis-
cussed one may want to distort the x axis (use different parameterization), and
this results in a variable smoothness scale la(x). As an example, Fig. (3.3) shows
the learning curve for la = 0.2 distributions that have been rescaled according
to x → x − 0.9 sin(2πx/L). For the rescaled variable, la(x) varies from 0.02 to
0.38. Two separate straight line fits—through the first five (shown) and the last
four points—are possible for this data. Each of the fits separately agrees with the
prediction, but their prefactors are different. This is probably just a numerical
artifact because 1000 Fourier modes used here feel like much less in some places
due to the rescaling, and this shows up at large enough N . Alternatively, this
may be an indication that a detailed analysis of the reparameterization invariant
formulation (Periwal 1997, 1998) is needed.
Finally, Fig. (3.4) illustrates learning when not only l, but also η is ‘wrong’ in
the sense defined above. We illustrate this for ηa = 2, 0.8, 0.6, 0 (remember that
only ηa > 0.5 removes UV divergences). Again, the inverse square root decay
of Λ should be observed, and this is evident for ηa = 2. The ηa = 0.8, 0.6, 0
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Figure 3.4: Λ as a function of N , ηa and la. Best fits: for ηa = 2, la = 0.1, Λ =
(0.40 ± 0.05)N−0.493±0.013, for ηa = 0.8, la = 0.1, Λ = (1.06 ± 0.08)N−0.355±0.008.
l = 0.2 for all graphs, but the one with ηa = 0, for which l = 0.1.
cases are different: even for N as high as 105 the estimate of the distribution is
far from the target, thus the asymptotic regime is not reached. This is a crucial
observation for our subsequent analysis of the smoothness scale determination
from the data (Section 3.5). Remarkably, Λ (both averaged and in the single runs
shown) is monotonic, so even in the cases of qualitatively less smooth distributions
there is still no overfitting. On the other hand, Λ is well above the asymptote for
η = 2 and small N , which means that initially too many details are expected and
wrongfully introduced into the estimate, but then they are almost immediately
(N ∼ 300) eliminated by the data.
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3.5 Selecting the smoothness scale
Results presented in the last Figures already suggest that Occam factors should
work in this infinite dimensional case, and that it indeed is possible to see this in
numerical simulations. The competition between the data and the Occam factor
is equivalent to minimizing the expression [cf. Eq. (A.6, A.7)]
H∗[φcl; {xi}; l] =
∫
dx
l
2
(∂xφcl)
2 +
N∑
j=1
φcl(xj) +
1
2
√
N
ll0
∫
dx exp [−φcl(x)/2] , (3.9)
which makes the total probability of the data maximal, and thus the length nee-
ded to code it minimal. How does the smoothness scale l∗ that minimizes H∗
behave? The data term [second in Eq. (3.9)] on average is equal to NDKL(P ||Qcl),
and it can be small compared to the other terms for very regular P (x). Then only
the kinetic and the fluctuation terms matter, and l∗ ∼ N1/3, as was obtained by
Bialek, Callan, and Strong (1996). For less regular distributions P (x) [cf. graphs
for ηa = 0, 0.6, 0.8 on Fig. (3.4)], this is not true. Indeed, for η = 1, Qcl(x) approx-
imates large scale features of P (x) very well, but details at scales smaller than
∼
√
l/NL are not present in it. If P (x) is taken from the prior, Eq. (3.2), charac-
terized by some ηa and la, then according to Eq. (3.8) the contribution of these
details falls off with the wave number k as ∼ (L/la)ηa−1/2k−ηa . Thus the expected
data term is
NDKL(P ||Qcl) ∼ N
∫ ∞
√
NL/l
(
L
la
)2ηa−1
k−2ηa = N
(
L
la
)2ηa−1 (NL
l
)−ηa+1/2
, (3.10)
and this is not necessarily small. For ηa < 1.5 it actually dominates the kinetic
term and competes with the Occam factor to establish the relevant smoothness
scale. Summarizing,
l∗ ∼ N1/3, ηa ≥ 1.5 (3.11)
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Figure 3.5: Smoothness scale selection by the data. The lines that go off the axis
for small N symbolize that H∗ monotonically decreases as l →∞.
l∗ ∼ N (ηa−1)/ηa , 0.5 < ηa < 1.5 . (3.12)
There are two noteworthy things about Eq. (3.12). First, for ηa = η = 1, l
∗ sta-
bilizes at some constant value, which we expect to be equal to la. Second, even
if ηa 6= η, but ηa < 1.5, then Eqs. (3.3, 3.12) ensure that Λ ∼ N1/2ηa−1, and this
asymptotic behavior will be reached almost immediately, unlike in the ηa = 0, 0.6
examples from Fig. (3.4). This performance is, at most, a constant factor away
from the limits set by heuristic calculations of predictive information, Eq. (2.99),
with the ‘right’ priors ηa = η 6= 1—a remarkable result!
We present simulations relevant to these predictions in Figs. (3.5, 3.6). Unlike
in the previous Figures, these results are not averaged due to extreme computa-
tional costs, so all our further claims, which are inherently statistical, have to be
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taken cautiously. On the other hand, selecting l∗ and observing the effects asso-
ciated with it in single runs has some practical advantages since then we are able
to ensure the best possible learning for any given realization of the data, not just
on average.
Figure (3.5) shows single learning runs for various ηa and la. In addition, to
keep the Figure readable, we do not show runs with ηa = 0.6, 0.7, 1.2, 1.5, 3, and
ηa → ∞, which is a finitely parameterizable distribution. All of these display a
good agreement with the predicted scalings, Eq. (3.11, 3.12).
Figure (3.6) shows the KL divergence between the target distribution and its
classical estimate calculated at l∗; the average of this divergence over the samples
and the prior is the learning curve. Again, the predictions are clearly fulfilled.
Note that for all ηa with exception of ηa = η = 1 there is indeed a qualitative
advantage in using the data induced smoothness scale. To illustrate this more
clearly and ease the comparison we replotted some of the curves with adaptive l
side by side with their fixed l analogues on Fig. (3.7).
3.6 Can the ‘wrong’ prior help?
The last four Figures have illustrated some aspects of learning with ‘wrong’ pri-
ors. However, more importantly, all of our results may be considered as belong-
ing to the ‘wrong prior’ class. Indeed, the actual probability distributions we
used were not nonparametric continuous functions with smoothness constraints,
but were composed of kc Fourier modes and thus had exactly 2kc parameters.
Usually it would take well over 2kc samples to even start to close down on the
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Figure 3.6: Learning with the data induced smoothness scale.
actual value of the parameters, and many more to get accurate results. How-
ever, using the wrong continuous parameterization [φ(x)] we were able to obtain
good fits for as low as 1000 samples [cf. Figs. (3.1)] with the help of the prior
Eq. (A.5). Moreover, learning happened continuously and monotonically with-
out huge chaotic jumps of overfitting that necessarily accompany any brute force
parameter estimation method at low N . So, for some cases, a seemingly more com-
plex model is actually easier to learn!
We can summarize this by stating that, when data are scarce and the param-
eters are abundant, one gains even by using the regularizing powers of wrong
priors. The priors select some large scale features that are the most important to
learn first and fill in the details as more data become available. If the global fea-
tures are dominant (arguably, this is generic), one actually wins in the learning
speed [cf. Figs. (3.2, 3.3, 3.6)]. If, however, small scale details are as important,
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of learning speeds for the same data sets with different
a priori assumptions. In all runs we learn using the model with η = 1, and l is
either predefined, or set by the Occam factor.
then one is at least guaranteed to avoid overfitting [cf. Fig. (3.4)].
Thus we can argue that our numerical experiments support the Occam–like
claim we made in Section 2.6: if two models provide equally good fits to data,
the simpler one should always be used. In particular, using Eq. (2.102) we see that for
our simulations, the nonparametric QFTmodel is simpler (as characterized by the
predictive information) than a finite dimensional one for N < Nc ∼ (kc log kc)2.
We operate in this regime in all of our simulations, and so we must learn faster
and with less overfitting if we use the wrong parameterization. Note, that these
results are very much in the spirit of our whole program: not only is the value of
l∗ selected that simplifies the description of the data, but the continuous param-
eterization itself serves the same purpose. This is an unexpectedly neat general-
ization of the MDL (Rissanen 1989) principle to nonparametric cases.
3.7. Discussion 93
3.7 Discussion
The field theoretic approach to density estimation in principle not only regular-
izes the learning process but also allows the self–consistent selection of smooth-
ness criteria through an infinite dimensional version of the Occam factors. We
have shown numerically that this works, evenmore clearly than was conjectured.
For ηa < 1.5, Qest and the learning curve Λ truly become properties of the data
and not of the Bayesian prior used for learning: one can set a learning machine
to work at η = 1 and be sure that this does not bias the estimates in any excessive
way. If we can extend these results to include ηa > 1.5 and combine this work
with the reparameterization invariant formulation of Periwal (1997, 1998), this
should give a complete theory of Bayesian learning for one dimensional distri-
butions, and this theory has no arbitrary parameters. In addition, if this theory
properly treats the limit ηa → ∞, we should be able to see how the well–studied
finite dimensional Occam razors and the MDL principle arise from a more gen-
eral nonparametric formulation.
These results also have some biological implications. First of all, it may be
that this smoothness scale adaptation mechanism is partly responsible for a com-
monly known effect: children learn faster than adults. More seriously, and more
closely connected to the models discussed here is the learning and development
of smooth ‘maps’ in the nervous system (see, for example, Knudsen et al. 1987).
These maps become much less susceptible to the sensory inputs as time passes,
and this may be interpreted in terms of stiffening of the smoothness constraint.
Indeed, starting from scratch, it is very easy to drift the smoothness scale to such
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large values that susceptibility of the learning machine (in other words, an ani-
mal) to the new data will be extremely small.
Second, if our conclusions are correct, then a learning machine that is pro-
grammed to solve problems at η = 1 can easily solve more complex problems with
any ηa, 1.5 > ηa > 0.5, by performing a simple averaging over the smoothness
scales. At worst, this procedure may lead to a constant multiplicative drop in
performance. By analogy, we may expect that, once an animal is able to treat a
problem that falls in any power–law class with respect to the predictive informa-
tion, then it is able to treat any problem that provides more predictive informa-
tion with only a multiplicative overhead. Since, as we have already discussed
(Hilberg 1990, Ebeling and Po¨schel 1994, Po¨schel, Ebeling, and Rose´ 1995), hu-
mans can solve power–law problems, it is encouraging to know that there is no
learning task in this world that is, in principle, too difficult for us (our lifetime is
the only limiting factor). More seriously, if it is, indeed, possible to construct a
complete theory of one (and, possibly, higher) dimensional learning, where both
the smoothness scale and the exponent can be self–consistently determined, then
the questions we asked in Section 2.6 (like “whatmodels do humans use for learn-
ing?”) may lose their meaning—any model is almost as good as any other, and it
is very difficult to look for possible multiplicative differences between them. Sur-
prisingly, these questions are meaningful if such a theory cannot be constructed.
In this case, as we saw in Eqs. (3.11, 3.12) and on Figs. (3.5, 3.6), a complex learn-
ing machine cannot effectively adapt to simple tasks. This again accords with
our subjective experience that it is sometime very hard to find a simple solution
when expecting a complex one. It should be possible to devise an experiment
that would quantify this failure to solve simple problems in complex contexts.
Chapter 4
Learning discrete variables:
Information–theoretic regularization
4.1 The general paradigm
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this work we discussed what we consider to be some
of the most interesting problems in modern statistics and learning theory. We
defined predictive information and complexity, studied the learning of nonpara-
metric distributions, and showed an example of how Occam factors generalized
to infinite dimensional problems. There is one tantalizing question that followed
us through this whole discussion: many problems require a prior to regularize
learning, but then how can one make sure that the estimates and the conclusions
are inferred from the data, rather then being imposed by some a priori knowledge
that the data do not support? The results in the infinite dimensional generaliza-
tion of the Occam factors seemed especially interesting in this respect—estimates
can become almost insensitive even to the qualitative choice of prior, at least in
a broad range. This conclusion, together with Periwal’s (1997, 1998) work, are
the only results known to us that aim towards constructing a reparameterization
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and prior invariant (or, better yet, ignorant) theory of nonparametric Bayesian
inference.
Even though we have concentrated on nonparametric problems, similar diffi-
culties also exist in seemingly simpler, parametric cases. The choice of the prior
for finite parameter learning scenarios is still a hot topic, and various alternatives
are proposed that make some universal theoretical sense within the framework
of information theory, MDL theory, etc. Examples include universal priors (Ris-
sanen 1983, Lee and Vita´nyi 1993) or Jeffreys’ priors (Clarke and Barron 1994,
Balasubramanian 1997).
We think, however, that the prior really should embody a priori knowledge,
and thus we cannot agree with the use of universal, globally definable choices.
On the other hand, there is an obvious appeal for approaches based on more
general theoretical principles. For example, the problems of nonuniform conver-
gence of the estimate to the target, Eq. (A.11), and of the infrared divergence of
predictive information, Eq. (2.97), are easily resolved if one turns to reparameter-
ization invariant priors (Periwal 1997, 1998). These have a clear theoretical edge
over non–invariant ones since they estimate a true density, that is, a function that
transforms like a density under reparameterizations of the independent variable.
As we tried to emphasize in this work, learning is information accrual, and,
therefore, it is a part of Shannon’s information theory. Thus a general theoretical
principle can be to construct priors solely from information–theoretic quantities
like entropy (or self–information), Kullback–Leibler divergence (or relative in-
formation), various mutual informations, etc., and with no other constraints. In
addition, since information–related quantities are formed from log–probabilities
it makes sense to include them exponentially into the priors, which are, after
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all, also probabilities. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we will present a simple example
that illustrates the use of this general principle—regularization with information–
theoretic quantities—and show that it is possible and advantageous to learn with
such priors.
4.2 Discrete variables: a need for special attention
When learning probability densities of continuous variables, except for the very
simple cases N >> dVC, priors are used to balance the quality of fits to the data
against the complexity of solutions (cf. Section 2.4.5 and Chapter 3); this smooth-
ing of data prevents overfitting. It is easy to construct smoothing priors for con-
tinuous variables: continuity implies a metric, so locality is defined, and then
one just needs to punish distributions that exhibit large variations over small dis-
tances. Such a ‘smoothness’ prior will work as a regularizer.
The case when a variable is discrete, and the (discrete) metric is impossible
to define, presents a problem. Usually this case is not considered interesting,
because the law of large numbers guarantees that, at large N , the frequencies
of events estimate probabilities well. However, if the number of examples N
is smaller or comparable to the number of possible outcomes K, then statistical
fluctuations are large. This situation is not as uncommon as one might hope. For
example, it is possible that syntactic structures in a language can be inferred from
statistical arguments alone (see, for example, Pereira et al. 1993, Manning and
Schu¨tze 1999). Estimating probabilities of occurrence of a few thousand common
words is rather easy. It is even feasible to construct conditional distributions of
nouns given verbs (Pereira et al. 1993). However, it is totally unrealistic to expect
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to build an accurate probability distribution of whole sentences from the raw data
without some a priori knowledge.
Similar problems appear in molecular biology. For example, gene expression
is governed by promoter regions in DNA molecules. These regions are usually
thought to be constructed from two five base pair long blocks (there are 45 pos-
sible different realizations of these) that appear anywhere inside ‘junk’ genetic
material, which is about a hundred bases in length. If one tries to find the mean-
ingful 5 + 5 structures by statistical methods (see, for example, van Helden et
al. 1998), then a probability distribution over 45 ∗ 45 ∼ 106 possibilities must be
constructed. Many experiments are done on yeast, and their genome is only a
few millions of base pairs long. So getting a full statistics is, at best, problematic.
Even worse, if one tries to look for a possibility of promoters of a different length,
then the problem becomes totally hopeless.
To solve these and similar problems, one needs smoothing priors that regu-
larize fluctuations. However, now there is no notion of locality to create them.
It is not at all evident how to impose smoothness conditions, or whether these
conditions will speed up learning in any way. It is clear though that any smooth-
ing must be global—we cannot talk about local changes, but global variability
is well defined. Recall that variability can be measured non–metrically by en-
tropies, and these have a very special meaning in information theory—they are
the unique measure of information (Shannon 1948). Therefore, learning a dis-
crete variable may turn out to be an excellent example of the general paradigm
introduced above.
In the next Sections we present a toy model for learning a discrete variable
and show that it is possible to regularize and speed up such learning with the
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help of information–theoretic priors. In general, discrete calculus is much less
developed than its continuous analogue (precisely for the reason that the notion
of locality is absent), so analytical results can usually be achieved only for very
simple problems, and our example is like that. Nonetheless, this case is of interest
as it solves some real world problems and, more importantly, because it develops
techniques that later will be used in more complicated tasks; the work on those is
already in progress.
4.3 Toy model: theory
Consider the following ‘real world’ problem. A US Census Bureau needs a pre-
liminary report on statistics of people in Trenton, NJ based on the Census–2000
data. Unfortunately, only a few thousand households have filled in their Cen-
sus cards, and this is clearly not enough to sample adequately many classes
x, x = 1 · · ·K (we also call them possible outcomes or bins) into which the peo-
ple are classified (ethnicity, marital status, educational level, size of the house-
hold, etc.) Suppose now that Newark, NJ, perceived to have a similar population
statistics, has been quick to organize door–to–door counting of people, so that
a good sampling of Newark’s population, Q∗(x), is available. Can the Census
Bureau statisticians use these data to answer their questions about the Trenton
people? An obvious solution would be to take a weighted average of the (un-
dersampled) Trenton counts and the (well sampled) Newark probabilities. But
how should the weights be set in order to ensure that the Trenton estimate is just
smoothed and not unfairly biased by the Newark data?
We can offer a solution to the problem by choosing an a prior probability
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density for Q(x), the Trenton distribution, that is biased towards the reference
Newark distribution Q∗(x). This may be done in the following form
P[Q(x), λ] = 1ZQ(λ) exp [−λD(Q
∗||Q)] δ
(
K∑
x=1
Q(x)− 1
)
P(λ), (4.1)
where P(λ) is some a priori normalized density for the inverse temperature–like
parameter λ, ZQ(λ) ≡ ∫ [dQ(x)]P[Q(x)||λ] is the normalization of the a priori dis-
tribution of Q(x) conditional on λ, and D is some measure of distance between
the two distributions, Q∗ and Q. If we want to stick to our paradigm of using
information–theoretic quantities only, then we do not have much freedom in se-
lectingD since the natural distance between any two distributions in information
theory is the familiar Kullback-Leibler divergence,
D(Q∗||Q) ≡ DKL(Q∗||Q) =
K∑
x=1
Q∗(x) log
Q∗(x)
Q(x)
. (4.2)
In the language of coding theory, this choice of D means that we optimize our
coding strategies forQ, but we wantQ’s such that the data coming from the refer-
ence distribution can be coded compactly also. We could have chosen to measure
distances in the opposite direction and switch arguments in the KL divergence.
Then the best coding forQ∗ is fixed, and we look for Q that is still coded well. We
chose Eq. (4.2) over the other choice because this allows an exact solution.
Now, similarly to Bialek et al. (1996, see also Appendix A.1), we apply the
Bayes formula to get the probability density for Q(x) and λ given the data {xi}
P [Q(x), λ|{xi}] = P [{xi}|Q(x), λ]P[Q(x), λ]
P ({xi})
=
P[Q(x), λ]∏Ni=1Q(xi)∫
[dQ(x)]dλP[Q(x), λ]∏Ni=1Q(xi) . (4.3)
The least square estimator of Q(x) is then, as usual,
Qest(x|{xi}) =
∫
dλ[dQ(x)] Q(x)P [Q(x), λ|{xi}]
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=
〈Q(x)Q(x1)Q(x2) · · ·Q(xN )〉(Q,λ)
〈Q(x1)Q(x2) · · ·Q(xN )〉(Q,λ) , (4.4)
where 〈· · ·〉(Q,λ) stands for averaging over Q and λwith respect to the prior; simi-
larly, 〈· · ·〉(Q) means averaging only over P[Q|λ].
If λwas fixed, then the averaging in Eq. (4.4) would have one integral less—a
simpler problem. However, varying it may allow the Occam factor that arises
from volumes in the Q-space to find some λ∗ that creates the shortest (thus the
most probable) description of the data (cf. Section 3.5). By achieving the optimal
balance between the ‘goodness of fit’ and closeness to the reference, this may
resolve the problem of a possible erroneous bias towards Q∗.
Asmentioned above, the solution of this model is rather simple. Wewrite n(x)
for the data count in the bin x,
∑
x n(x) = N . Then, leaving aside the λ integral
for a while, we have (see Appendix A.2):
〈Q(x1) · · ·Q(xN )〉(Q) =
∫
[dQ]
e−λDKL(Q
∗||Q)
ZQ(λ) δ(
∑
x
Q(x)− 1)∏
x
Q(x)n(x) (4.5)
=
eS[Q
∗]
ZQ(λ)
∫
[dQ]δ(
∑
x
Q(x)− 1)∏
x
Q(x)n(x)+λQ
∗(x) (4.6)
=
eS[Q
∗]
ZQ(λ)
∏K
x=1 Γ
(
n(x) + λQ∗(x) + 1
)
Γ(λ+N +K)
, (4.7)
where S[Q∗] is just the entropy of the reference distribution. ZQ(λ) is given by the
same integral, Eq. (4.5, 4.7), but with n(x) = N = 0. Therefore, if we now integrate
over λ using the steepest descent technique, then the most probable value of the
inverse temperature is determined by
N∑
j=1
1
λ∗ +K + j − 1 −
K∑
x=1
n(x)∑
j=1
Q∗(x)
λ∗Q ∗ (x) + j = 0. (4.8)
Numerically (cf. Section 4.4) this equation has one nontrivial solution for large
N , so that the Occam factor seems to work again. Unfortunately, however, we
4.3. Toy model: theory 102
were unable to obtain satisfying analytical results with exception of some trivial
asymptotic limits. If, on the other hand, we keep λ fixed, then [see Eq. (4.4)]
Qest(x|{xi};λ) = n(x) + λQ
∗(x) + 1
N + λ+K
(4.9)
The simplicity of this result is intriguing. Our initial suggestion to average the
actual undersampled data with the well sampled smoothing distribution turns
out to have deep roots in Bayesian inference with the prior Eq. (4.1)!
Note the presence of ‘+1’ in Eqs. (4.7, 4.9). Due to this term the estimated
distribution is a smoothed version of the counts n(x) even if λ → 0. In this the-
ory, no bin has an estimated probability of zero, so that DKL(Q
∗||Q) always is
well defined, and observing the next sample in any bin never is a completely
unexpected event. This summand, which has so many desirable consequences,
appears because we define the prior, Eq. (4.1), on the space of Q’s. Changing the
variables from probabilities to likelihoods, −φ(x) = logQ(x), creates a Jacobian
which effectively adds one count in every bin. Maximal likelihood estimation of
parameters does not have this feature, and this is yet another argument in favor
of the Bayesian formulation.
Even though this toy model has an exact solution, it still is instructive to per-
form a saddle point (large N) analysis in the hope that some useful knowledge
reusable in more complex settings will be gained. With the usual change of vari-
ables,
Q(x) = e−φ(x), Q∗(x) = e−φ
∗(x), (4.10)
leaving the λ integral aside again, and replacing the δ-function by its Fourier
representation, we get the following expression for the correlation functions:
〈Q(x1) · · ·Q(xN )〉(Q) =
∫
[dφ(x)]
ZQ(λ)
dµ
2π
e−H[φ(x),iµ,λ,φ
∗(x)]−
∑
x
[n(x)+1]φ(x), (4.11)
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H [φ(x), iµ, λ, φ∗(x)] = λ
∑
x
Q∗(x)[φ(x)− φ∗(x)] + iµ(∑
x
e−φ(x) − 1). (4.12)
Calculating up to one–loop corrections using the steepest descent techniques, this
Hamiltonian results in
〈Q(x1) · · ·Q(xN )〉(Q) = e−Heff [φcl(x),λ,φ∗(x)]−
∑
x
[n(x)+1]φcl(x), (4.13)
Heff [φcl(x), λ, φ
∗(x)] = H [φcl(x), iµ = N + λ+K, λ, φ
∗(x)]
+
K
2
log
(
1 +
N
λ
)
+
1
2
∑
x
(φ∗(x)− φcl(x)), (4.14)
Qcl(x) ≡ e−φcl(x) = n(x) + λQ
∗(x) + 1
N + λ+K
(4.15)
Again, just like in Eqs. (3.1, A.7), the fluctuation determinant [the last two terms
in Eq. (4.14)] has a different λ dependence than the data and the prior terms.
This suggests, even more clearly than the exact result Eq. (4.7), that competition
between them will select a nontrivial most probable value of λ∗.
Note thatQest, Eq. (4.9), is equal toQcl. A priori one should not expect them to
be similar even for largeN . Indeed, the matrix of second derivatives in the saddle
point calculation has eigenvalues ∼ n(x), and these are small for bins with small
counts. So, in principle, one could expect large discrepancies between the exact
and the classical solutions. The fact that they are the same inspires a hope that the
saddle point analysis may remain useful for other, more complex, problems.
Finally, we want to illustrate yet another important aspect of this toy model.
What is the predictive information for this system? In general, it is difficult to
calculate, so we consider two very simple limits: λ ≪ N, K ≪ N , and 1≪ N ≪
λ,K ≪ λ. The first case closely parallels calculations of Section 2.4.2 and yields
S1(N) ≈ K
2
logN. (4.16)
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In the second case, somewhat lengthy calculations lead to
S(N) = NS[Q∗] + S1(N), lim
N→∞,N/λ→0
S1 ≈ 0, (4.17)
where S[Q∗] is again the entropy of the reference distribution. These results are
expected: for small λ and large N this problem is just learning a K–parameter
distribution, so Eq. (2.50) should hold. On the other hand, for extremely large λ,
the estimate converges to the reference distribution regardless of the data, so the
problem is effectively zero dimensional.
If we do estimates at some large, but fixed, λ, then we should see a crossover
from the zero to theK parameter regime. 1 For generic distributions the crossover
will be smooth, since each bin starts to add its (1/2) logN to the predictive in-
formation independently when the estimate for that bin switches from the ref-
erence value to the count, i. e., when n(x) > λQ∗(x) [cf. Eq. (4.9)]. A smooth
crossover from zero to the logarithm is possible only through a faster than loga-
rithmic growth for some range of N . Indeed, from the discussion in Section 2.4.6,
we know that continuous addition of extra degrees of freedom is a sign of the
power–law growth of predictive information. It is remarkable that a discrete sys-
tem as simple as this toy model can exhibit such a rich behavior that, so far, has
been associated with only very complex nonparametric models; we will see a
numerical demonstration of this in the next section.
1If we average over λ, and λ∗(N)/N starts large and drifts to below 1 as N increases, then we
will still observe the crossover. This behavior of λ∗ is possible since at low N most of the weight
should go to the smoothing term, while at large N
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4.4 Toy model: numerical analysis
If we want to be able to observe all of the features described in the previous sec-
tion, thenK, the number of bins, should be large enough to allow for a prominent
prior–dominated (scarce data) region, but it also should be small enough so that
we can generate enough samples and observe a cross–over to the data–driven
regime in all bins. The choice of K = 75, 100, 125 reasonably satisfies both condi-
tions and will be used in all of our simulations.
The next important question is the generation of random distributions from
the prior, Eq. (4.1). Due to the δ-function normalization constraint this is a com-
plicated task. However, in the limit of large λ, DKL[Q
∗||Q] typically is small and
can be approximated by the χ2 distance
lim
DKL→0
DKL[Q
∗(x)||Q(x)] = 1
2
K∑
x=1
[Q(x)−Q∗(x)]2
Q∗(x)
. (4.18)
Then the prior, Eq. (4.1), becomes a multi–variable normal density, and genera-
tion of random distributions is easy 2.
The choice of λ is motivated by the same arguments as the choice of K. The
asymptotic regime is reached for λK > N , while simulations are time limited
by N ∼ 105. Therefore, we must use λ of up to about 1000. On the other hand
we want to see as much of the prior–enforced learning as possible, so we choose
to work close to this limit: λ = 300, 500, 1000. One may be concerned that these
large values will produce random distributions that are almost identical to the
reference, which would make some of our results less interesting. Fig. (4.1) shows
2The KL divergence tends to the χ2 measure from below. Thus replacing DKL with χ
2 pro-
duces a slightly narrower prior; this difference becomes smaller as λ grows. In principle, this can
produce dramatic changes in statistics, but for our choices of independent parameters this turns
out to be almost irrelevant.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between the reference distribution and a typical random
one generated with λ = 500, and K = 100. Each point corresponds to the values(
Q∗(x), Q(x)
)
in one of the bins x.
that these fears are misplaced. The reference and the random distributions are
similar (as we want them to be), but not excessively so.
4.4.1 Learning with the correct prior
Fig. (4.2) shows the N dependence of the universal learning curve Λ [averaged
KL divergence, Eqs. (2.13, 3.3)], for various combinations of λ and K. All of the
behavior predicted in Section 4.3 is observed clearly. The learning curves start
out flat (predictive information and the effective number of parameters are zero)
and soon enter a continuous series of transitions that addmore andmore degrees
of freedom. Finally the behavior enforced by Eq. (2.62),
Λ(N) =
K
2N
, (4.19)
is reached. Notice that, in agreement with the claim that the number of active
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Figure 4.2: Λ as a function of λ, K, and N for λ = λa.
parameters depends on the comparison between the counts and the value of λ,
the asymptotic regime is reached at earlier N for smaller values of the parame-
ter. The agreement with this asymptotic behavior is so remarkably good that we
chose not to quote any fits: all of them are within the expected errors.
In the pre–asymptotic regime, learning curves with larger λ start lower since
there the random distributions are very close to the reference and are estimated
much better by it. Similarly, curves with smaller K also start lower because now
there are fewer degrees of freedom and, therefore, fewer ways to get a larger KL
divergence.
4.4.2 Learning with ‘wrong’ priors
As we did for nonparametric distributions in Section 3.4, we now want to in-
vestigate the performance of the learning algorithm on atypical data sequences.
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Figure 4.3: Λ as a function of λ, λa, Q
∗
a and N . For all curves K = 100.
That is, as before, we will differentiate two sets of parameters: λ and Q∗, which
encode the expectations of the learning machine, and λa and Q
∗
a, which together
with Eq. (4.1) describe the ensemble of atypical target distributions. Simulations
related to this question are summarized in Fig. (4.3). Here we have shown learn-
ing with different combinations of λ 6= λa, and the case λ = λa = 500, Q∗ = Q∗a is
plotted as a reference. Comparing the curves with the corresponding ones from
the previous Figure, we clearly see that, even though learning with an ‘incorrect’
prior is possible, there are discrepancies: convergence to the asymptotic limit is
different, and the curves start slightly higher then their ‘correct’ counterparts.
Another interesting example shown is when λ is ‘correct’, but the reference
distribution itself is totally wrong. We see that this type of mistake is much more
costly: even forN as large as 105 the influence of the wrong reference distribution
is still strong enough to compromise fast learning.
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Note the curve with λa = 500, λ = 0. This is a case of ‘trivial’ learning, when
the only regularization is due to the Jacobian of the Q → φ transformation [the
‘+1’ term in Eq. (4.9)]. If not for it, the estimate would be extremely overfitted
and would have zeros, and the Λ would explode. On the other hand, with the
’+1’ correction, Λ starts out from a constant value, which is the KL divergence
between the target and the uniform distribution.
4.4.3 Selecting λwith the help of the data
Having shown how the learning machine performs on expected and unexpected
data samples, we are now in a position to ask if the Occam factors can select
the right regularization parameter λ as in the case of finite dimensional models
(MacKay 1992, Balasubramanian 1997) and nonparametric models (Bialek, Cal-
lan, and Strong 1996, and Section 3.5 of the present work). This question has
an affirmative answer, and Fig. (4.5) shows λ∗, the value of λ that maximizes
the correlation function Eq. (4.7) and minimizes the exponent in Eq. (4.13). We
show the results averaged over many runs, even though this form of presentation
is questionable because λ∗ fluctuates a lot in different trials. These fluctuations
explain the kinks on the three lower curves. For N to the left of the kinks, there
are many realizations of the data, for which there is no best value for λ, and
the correlation functions are maximized at λ∗ → ∞. The kinks appear due to
the numerically imposed finite cutoff on possible values of the parameter. Apart
than this, the rest of the learning curves’ behavior is as hoped. For ensembles
generated at λa = 500 and studied at Q
∗ = Q∗a, λ
∗ turns out to be very close to
500. If Q∗ 6= Q∗a, λ∗ drifts to smaller values, letting the data, not the reference,
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Figure 4.4: λ∗ for various ensembles of target distributions.
control the estimate. The same happens for λa = 0 for any Q
∗ since at this value
of the parameter the target is, again, far from the reference.
Finally, we examine the case where the ensemble of the distributions is qual-
itatively closer to the reference than the prior, Eq. (4.1), allows (this corresponds
to η 6= ηa for nonparametric learning). This can be achieved by having a higher
power of the KL divergence in the exponent of the prior, but such a choice is very
difficult for numerical simulations. So we take an easier, but less illustrative ex-
ample of λa = ∞; that is, the target distribution is exactly equal to the reference.
Here, not surprisingly, λ∗ quickly becomes very large. Again, it often exceeds the
numerical cutoff, so the average line shown should not be taken to literally.
Finishing up this section, in Fig. (4.4) we show the learning curves calculated
at λ = λ∗ for all the cases considered above. Comparing to the corresponding
learning curves in Fig. (4.3), we deduce that learning with an adaptive λ is much
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Figure 4.5: Learning with an adaptive λ∗.
faster than with a fixed wrong one, and the example with λa = ∞ is particularly
demonstrative 3. The only learning curve which starts off slightly worse than its
fixed λ analogue is that for λa = 500, Q
∗ = Q∗a. Even though it improves very
quickly, this once again proves the common knowledge that for small sample
sizes nothing beats learning with the ‘correct’ prior.
4.5 Further work
The toy example we have investigated resolves the questions it was meant to
answer. Yet it is just a toy example, and most of its value lies in the extension to
more difficult problems.
The most straightforward, but very interesting development is one that has
3This remarkable performance for λa = ∞ is achieved with the upper cutoff on λ∗, and it is
possible that Λ can fall off even faster without the cutoff.
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been already mentioned in passing. Reversing the direction of the KL divergence
in Eq. (4.1) and choosing a uniform reference distribution Q∗, we obtain a prior
that favors distributions with larger entropies, i. e., the flattest and the most regu-
lar distributions. Finding the least variable distribution compatible with the data
is certainly in the spirit of our work and deserves an investigation.
This idea may be made more sophisticated when the independent variable is
a vector, ~x = {x, y}. If the distribution Q(~x) is expected to be smooth, but the
cardinalities of x and y (Kx andKy respectively) are large, then only the marginal
distributions Q(x) =
∑
yQ(x, y) and Q(y) =
∑
xQ(x, y) are sampled well for Kx
and Ky ≪ N ∼ KxKy. To smooth the data we might want to weight the a priori
probability of Q(x, y) by the entropy S[Q(x, y)]. However, this choice, though
valid, is not the best. Indeed, the entropy can be small because the marginals are
very narrow. But in the limit we are interested in, the marginals are well defined
by the data and do not require separate smoothing. So it is not the entropy of a
distribution, but its value with respect to the entropy of the marginals that should
enter a regularizing prior. This is the mutual information I(x, y) between x and
y, and it is, once again, a meaningful information–theoretic quantity.
A more ambitious but very appealing direction is to combine these methods
with the relevant information extraction ideas of Tishby et al. (1999) and Bialek
and Tishby (in preparation), discussed briefly in Section 2.6. Recall, that these
authors proposed to compress (that is, to smooth) the variable x into xˆ so that the
mutual information I(xˆ, y) remains as close to I(x, y), as possible. There is a one
parameter family of solutions to the problem, and this parameter measures the
relative importance of compression (smoothing) and preservation of the informa-
tion (fit to the data). In many practical applications, choosing the right value of
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this parameter is a problem. We can view the result of Tishby et al. as a classical
solution to a problem with some (yet to be defined) prior. One can realistically
expect that the value of the parameter will, once again, be set by the Occam factor.
If this theory succeeds, we can use these results to further advance the the-
ory of learning a nonparametric variable. Derivatives of densities do not have
any special meaning in the framework of information theory. Using them, as in
Eq. (A.5) or its reparameterization invariant version (Periwal 1997, 1998), is thus
not a preferred regularization. Building priors that include terms with deriva-
tives of many different orders and fixing coefficients of the terms by requiring
that the estimate does not depend on the UV details of the data (rounding or
truncation) 4 may work and have a meaning in QFT, but this is an approach alien
to information theory. Similarly, preferring distributions that are close to their
filtered version and averaging over the filters afterwards5 has the same prob-
lem. What we mean by smoothness in any formulation, including nonparametric
continuous ones, is that the independent, possibly continuous, variable x can be
successfully coded in some xˆ of finite and small cardinality such that this com-
pacted version explains the data almost as well as the original one. For example,
in the finite parameter case, xˆ = α. Developing a theory for smoothing through
compression would be a great achievement in itself, and within this formalism
we get the added advantage that the right balance between the goodness of fit
and the compression will again be determined by the Occam factor.
This is obviously only a start to an extensive program of generalizations, and
we hope make a significant progress along these lines in the near future.
4This Wilsonian renormalization group approach was suggested by V. Periwal.
5This idea is by W. Bialek.
Chapter 5
Conclusion: what have we achieved?
Let us summarize our achievements and compare them to the promises we made
and the desires we expressed in the beginning of this work. As promised, we
built a uniform and universally valid approach to learning by using information
theory and treating learning as an ability to predict. For this we defined a new
quantity, the predictive information, and the study of it revealed that it not only
measures the information relevant to prediction of a time series, but also defines
uniquely the complexity of the process that generated the series. Statistical me-
chanics gave an insight on how learning is always annealing in the model space,
and then we could illuminate numerous connections to statistical learning and
coding theories and catch some omissions in those. Summarizing, we indeed
delivered on the promise of a coherent re–treatment of the old knowledge.
Then we went further and showed that conventional finite parameter models
are not the only possible scenario. We investigated nonparametric and (under-
sampled) discrete learning to show that the capacity control mechanisms work
much better then one might have thought. We showed that the ’information the-
ory only’ approach to learning can be made self consistent and does not need any
supplemental help to survive. All of these efforts constitute an attempt to build
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up some new flesh around the core of ideas that are the focal point of our atten-
tion. This flesh may seem too thin, and it certainly is—a lot more has to be done
before one can finally say: “The End!” However, one has to start somewhere, and
we did.
Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Summary of nonparametric learning
The main problem of statistics—inferring distributions from a finite data set—
has a wide variety of possible practical applications. Usually, based on some a
priori considerations, an observer has some finite-dimensional model for the dis-
tribution being studied. Then the problem reduces to an estimation of a finite
number of parameters from a large data set, and this is relatively well-studied
(see, for example, Vapnik 1998, Balasubramanian 1997, and Sections 2.4.1–2.4.5
of the current work). Unfortunately, reducing the problem to a finite number of
parameters heavily biases the outcome of statistical inference: the true distribu-
tion may not even be in the chosen family. Thus lately it has become popular to
look for nonparametric solutions to the problem of learning distributions (recent
reviews are Dey et al. 1998 and Lemm 1999). As discussed in Section 2.4.5, non-
parametric estimations necessarily are prior dependent, i. e., Bayesian. Therefore,
the result of the inference is a probability distribution of probability distributions,
which becomes more concentrated as the number of samples increases. Even
though the result depends on the prior, the prior may be very mildly restrictive
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(say only some smoothness constraints are assumed), and then the bias is less
than in any finite parameter setting.
Recently Bialek, Callan, and Strong presented an elegant formulation that
casts nonparametric Bayesian learning in the familiar setting of statistical me-
chanics or, equivalently, Euclidean Quantum Field Theory (QFT) (Bialek, Callan,
and Strong 1996). This approach and some alternative formulations were further
developed by Periwal (1997, 1998), Holy (1997), and Aida (1998). In the present
work, we have utilized heavily the techniques and results of Bialek et al. and ex-
panded or corrected some of their conclusions. To make our presentation more
self contained, we here present a brief overview of the theory augmented with
some comments of our own.
Following the original reference, if N i. i. d. samples {xi}, i = 1 . . . N, are ob-
served, then the probability that a particular density Q(x) gave rise to these data
is given by the application of the Bayes formula
P [Q(x)|{xi}] = P [{xi}|Q(x)]P[Q(x)]
P ({xi}) =
P[Q(x)]∏Ni=1Q(xi)∫
[dQ(x)]P[Q(x)]∏Ni=1Q(xi) , (A.1)
where P[Q(x)] encodes our a priori expectations of Q. Specifying this prior on a
space of functions defines a QFT, and the optimal least squares estimator is then
given by a ratio of correlation functions
Qest(x|{xi}) =
∫
[dQ(x)]Q(x)P [Q(x|{xi})] (A.2)
=
〈Q(x)Q(x1)Q(x2) . . . Q(xN )〉(Q)
〈Q(x1)Q(x2) . . . Q(xN)〉(Q) , (A.3)
where 〈. . .〉(Q) means averaging with respect to the prior. Since Q(x) ≥ 0, it is
convenient to define an unconstrained field φ(x)
Q(x) ≡ 1
l0
e−φ(x), (A.4)
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Unlike another possible choice, Q(x) = [φ(x)]2, (Holy 1997) this definition puts Q
and φ in one–to–one correspondence.
The next step is to select a prior that regularizes the infinite number of degrees
of freedom and allows learning. We require that when we estimate the distribu-
tion Q(x) the answer must be everywhere finite. Also we want the prior P[φ] to
make sense as a continuous theory, so that the statistics of φ(x) on large scales
are not affected, for example, by discretization or round–off errors in x on small
scales. This implies that we should look for a renormalization group invariant
prior (the first steps along this direction were performed in Aida 1998) 1. Simpler,
but almost equally satisfying, is any ultraviolet (UV) convergent prior. For x in
one dimension, a minimal choice that is the easiest for theoretical (and, acciden-
tally, numerical) analysis is
P[φ(x)] = 1Z exp
− l
2
∫
dx
(
∂φ
∂x
)2 δ [ 1
l0
∫
dx e−φ(x) − 1
]
, (A.5)
where Z is the normalization constant, and the δ-function enforces normalization
of Q. The coefficient l defines a scale below which variations in φ are considered
to be too rapid, thus we refer to l as the smoothness scale. Bymaking this scale local,
one may also achieve reparameterization invariance of learned results (Periwal
1997, 1998).
The resulting field theory was solved by Bialek et al. up to one–loop correc-
tions in the limit of large N using standard semiclassical techniques:
〈Q(x1) · · ·Q(xN )〉(Q) ≈ 1
lN0
exp
(
−Heff [φcl(x); {xi}; l]−
N∑
j=1
φcl(xj)
)
, (A.6)
1As noted by V. Periwal in private communication, one may hope to construct a complete the-
ory of nonparametric learning in many dimensions by choosing a renormalization group compli-
ant prior. That is, the prior’s (many) parameters have to be defined to change with the renormal-
ization group flow in such a way that the resulting correlation functions do not depend on the
cutoff scale, which is in its turn due to round–off, discretization, or filtering.
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Heff [φcl(x); {xi}; l] = l
2
∫
dx(∂xφcl)
2 +
1
2
(
N
ll0
)1/2 ∫
dx e−φcl(x)/2, (A.7)
l∂2xφcl(x) +
N
l0
exp[−φcl(x)] =
N∑
j=1
δ(x− xj) , (A.8)
where φcl is the ‘classical’ solution to the field theory. In the effective Hamiltonian
[Eq. (A.7)], the first term is due to the value of the prior at φcl, while the second
one is the infinite dimensional determinant arising from one–loop integration
over fluctuations around the classical solution. Calculating this determinant is
the most technically involved step in the solution, and this can be done using
a standard van Vleck technique (see, for example, Chapter 7 of Coleman 1988).
This term is a direct analog of Occam factors that appear in finitely parameter-
izable models (MacKay 1992, Balasubramanian 1997) and allow one to build a
complexity penalizing razor.
Using the WKB method, the authors have shown that the solutions [both the
classical approximation Qcl = (1/l0) exp(−φcl), and the optimal least squares es-
timator Qest, Eq. (A.3)] are non–singular even at finite N and are essentially self
consistent averagings of fluctuations (samples) over regions of a (local) size
ξ ∼ [l/NQcl(x)]1/2 . (A.9)
It was assumed implicitly that the target distribution P (x) being learned varies
negligibly over this length scale, and then the WKB method can be used again to
show that the fluctuations in the estimate, ψ(x) ≡ φ(x) − [− logP (x)] behave at
large N as
〈ψ(x)〉 = l
NP (x)
∂2x logP (x) + · · · , (A.10)〈
[δψ(x)]2
〉
=
1
4
1√
NP (x)l
+ · · · . (A.11)
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If P (x) is not smooth enough, then in both of these equations one must replace
P by its version smoothed over the local smoothness scale ξ (for more on this
see Section 3.5). Note also that the variance of the fluctuations is not uniformly
small; this is a direct result of parameterization dependence of the prior, Eq. (A.5)
(Periwal 1998).
One of the most interesting conjectures of the Bialek et al. (1996) paper is that
the Occam factor (the fluctuation determinant) is enough to construct a complex-
ity razor just as in the finite parameter case. Indeed, one may impose an a priori
distribution on l and average over it after the correlation function, Eq. (A.6), is
found. The kinetic and the fluctuation determinant terms of the effective Hamil-
tonian, Eq. (A.7), have opposite dependences on l, so at large N the average
should be dominated by some l∗, for whichHeff is minimal. The data itself should
select the best smoothness scale consistent with the finite parameter Minimal De-
scription Length paradigm of Rissanen (1983, 1989) and the Occam’s complexity
razor of MacKay (1992) and Balasubramanian (1997). With the same implicit as-
sumption of a very smooth P (x) the authors have concluded that
l∗ ∼ N1/3. (A.12)
If P (x) is not smooth enough, a different dependence of l∗ on N should be ex-
pected (cf. Section 3.5).
This approach has a few shortcomings, most of them arising from reparame-
terization noninvariance and omission of clear identification of the above–men-
tioned smooth target assumption. Some of these problems are discussed in our
present work, and some have been analyzed by Periwal (1997, 1998).
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A.2 Correlation function evaluation
In the step from Eq. (4.6) to Eq. (4.7) we have performed the integral of the fol-
lowing form
I =
∫ 1
0
dt1 dt2 · · · dtK
K∏
j=1
t
zj
j δ
(
1−
K∑
k=1
tk
)
, (A.13)
where tj was Q(x), zj was n(x) + λQ
∗(x), and the limit of integration for each
variable is 1 because probabilities are normalized to one. This integral may be
calculated in a straightforward manner by integrating out each variable in turn.
This creates a product of B–functions, which can be simply reduced to the final
result, Eq. (A.17). However, this ease of integration is a consequence of the sim-
plicity of our toy model. Some other models currently under investigation (see
Section 4.5) involve similar integrals, but they are sufficiently different to prohibit
easy exact calculations. Keeping these possible applications in mind, we want to
show a trickier integration method of Eq. (A.13) that may be more useful in other
problems.
First note that due to the δ–function, which enforces the normalization, only
tj ’s less than or equal to 1matter. So wemay equally well replace the upper limits
of all integrals in Eq. (A.13) by +∞. Then we can replace the delta function by
its Fourier representation, shift the contour of integration by a small ε to the right
[the contours and the directions of the integrations are shown in Fig. (A.1)], and
exchange the order of the integrals
I =
∫ ∞
0
dt1 dt2 · · · dtK
K∏
j=1
t
zj
j
∫
C1
dµ
2πi
eµ(1−
∑K
k=1
tk) (A.14)
= lim
ε→0
∫
C2
dµ
2πi
eµ
K∏
j=1
[∫ ∞
0
dtj t
zj
j e
−µtj
]
. (A.15)
Now, since we shifted the contour, Reµ > 0. Therefore each of the internal
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Figure A.1: Integration contours.
integrals in Eq. (A.15) is a Γ function:
I =
K∏
j=1
Γ(zj + 1)× lim
ε→0
∫
C2
dµ
2πi
eµ∏
j µ
zj+1
(A.16)
In more complex cases we probably would have stopped here, tradingK real
integrals of Eq. (A.13) for one contour integration in the complex plane—this is
why this method may be of use. However, our toy model is very easy, so we
can proceed further and do the µ integration. Remembering that ε is small, we
can now use the Jordan’s lemma and bend the integration contour C2 into C3.
Then using a well known formula for the integral representation of the inverse
Γ–function [Gradshtein and Ryzhik 1965, Eq. (8.315)] we get
I =
∫ 1
0
dt1 dt2 · · · dtK
K∏
j=1
tzjδ
(
1−
K∑
k=1
tk
)
=
∏K
j=1 Γ(zj + 1)
Γ(
∑K
j=1 zj +K)
(A.17)
Note that, in the case of Eq. (4.6), the sum of zj ’s is just N .
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